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This paper studies socially responsible behavior in markets. We develop a laboratory 
product market in which low-cost production creates a negative externality for third parties, but 
where alternative production with higher costs mitigates the externality. Our first study, 
conducted in Switzerland, reveals a persistent preference among many consumers and firms for 
avoiding negative social impact in the market, reflected both in the composition of product types 
and in a price premium for socially responsible products. Socially responsible behavior is 
generally robust to varying market characteristics, such as increased seller competition and 
limited consumer information, and it responds to prices in a manner consistent with a model in 
which positive social impact is a utility-enhancing feature of a consumer product. In a second 
study, we investigate whether market social responsibility varies across societies by comparing 
market behavior in Switzerland and China. While subjects in Switzerland and China do not differ 
in their degree of social concern in non-market contexts, we find that low-cost production that 
creates negative externalities is significantly more prevalent in markets in China. Across both 
studies, consumers in markets exhibit less social concern than subjects in a comparable 
individual choice context. JEL Codes: C92, D03, D62, M14  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Adam Smith’s metaphor of the “invisible hand” illustrates the idea that decentralized 
interaction of independent actors, through market exchange, leads to efficient allocation of 
resources. In fact, there exists widespread evidence that markets often fulfill this function. 
However, unregulated market exchange is also often blamed as a source of social ills, including 
environmental damage, labor coercion and animal cruelty, and many scholars question whether 
the inherent nature of markets erodes people’s motivations to exhibit concern for the social 
impact of their actions (Bowles 1998; Sandel 2012; Falk and Szech 2013; Besley 2013).  
Indeed, returning to the efficacy of the invisible hand, an important underlying condition 
is the absence of negative externalities. When the social costs of market activity are not borne by 
the trading parties in the market—as in the examples above—then markets can systematically 
underappreciate such impacts, absent some other channel through which they are incorporated. 
Hence, a standard response to the problem of external effects is to call for an active role for 
government in regulating or taxing activities that impose externalities. 
An alternative remedy occurs if market participants voluntarily internalize the social 
impacts of their actions. Firms may voluntarily incur additional production costs to limit negative 
environmental impacts, as reflected in Apple CEO Tim Cook’s statement to shareholders that the 
firm does “a lot of things for reasons besides profit motive. We want to leave the world better 
than we found it” (Politi, 2014). However, the extent to which such acts reflect true concern for 
social impact, rather than for firm reputation and long-term profits, is unclear. At the same time, 
consumers may be willing to pay higher prices for products that mitigate social harm. Several 
studies document such willingness (Roe et al. 2001; Johnston et al. 2001; Louriero et al. 2001; 
De Pelsmacker et al. 2005), though these results are typically from hypothetical choice or 
willingness-to-pay measures or from comparisons of purchasing behavior over distinct market 
products that may differ in dimensions beyond social impact, such as actual or perceived quality.  
Thus, while the notion of individual and corporate social responsibility—a willingness to 
sacrifice profits or wealth in pursuit of broader social interest—has recently come into focus as a 
means to prevent efficiency losses due to external effects (Bénabou and Tirole 2010),1 the extent 
to which this presents an actual remedy for negative impacts of market activity remains to be 
                                                            
1 This notion is, however, not new to economics. For example, Arrow (1970) called “attention to a less visible form 
of social action: norms of social behavior, including ethical and moral codes” and suggested “as one possible 
interpretation that they are reactions of society to compensate for market failures” (p. 22).  
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better understood. The presence of product labels such as “carbon free,” “fair trade” and “cruelty 
free” in consumer product markets—often associated with higher production costs for firms and 
prices for consumers—suggests a potential influence of concerns for social impact on market 
activity. But, in real product markets it is difficult to isolate social responsibility from other 
possible motives underlying production and consumption of such products.2 
To address this issue, we report two laboratory studies that explore the extent to which 
socially responsible market behavior can mitigate the problem of negative external effects. Our 
paradigm models a competitive product market, in which sellers decide on a price and on which 
type of product they want to offer for sale—either one that produces a negative externality for a 
third party or one that does not, with the latter involving higher production costs. Consumers 
choose which offered product to buy, or whether to buy a product at all. We allow repetition, to 
observe outcomes that arise with experience in the market. The standard equilibrium prediction 
for these markets is that only the cheaper good, which produces the externality, is traded.  
In contrast to this prediction, a baseline condition from our first study—conducted in 
Switzerland—finds that markets converge rapidly to a stable outcome in which a significant 
proportion (roughly 45 percent) of products traded cost more to produce, but yield no externality. 
The prices for such goods are regularly higher than prices for externality-producing products, 
though to a lesser extent than the additional production cost. Thus, in our markets, sellers and 
buyers share, on average, the burden for preventing negative externalities. We interpret these 
findings as evidence that fair or moral behavior can persist in competitive market exchange.  
One goal of our research is to study how varying factors affect the prevalence of socially 
responsible market behavior. Real markets sometimes fail to internalize externalities, as with 
widespread instances of pollution, while in other cases they appear to reflect greater concern for 
social impacts. The extent to which market participants internalize social impacts thus varies and 
may be influenced by factors such as market characteristics, production technologies and culture. 
Therefore, we study the robustness of social responsibility, starting from the level we observe in 
the baseline market condition with subjects in Switzerland.  
First, we study the effect of increased seller competition, by adding supra-marginal firms 
to the market, which should theoretically have no effect. However, increased competition might 
                                                            
2 The possibility that market participants voluntarily internalize external costs is also consistent with evidence that 
decision makers in non-market contexts regularly demonstrate concern for the external impacts of their actions 
(Hoffman et al. 1994; Andreoni and Miller 2002; Fisman et al. 2007; Cappelen et al. 2007). 
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diminish fairness concerns (Roth et al. 1991) and, more broadly, is often considered a potentially 
corrupting influence in market behavior (Shleifer 2004; Cai and Liu 2009; Brandts et al. 2009). 
In our market, increased competition drives down overall prices, thus yielding greater relative 
surplus for consumers. But, increased competition does not diminish the degree of concern 
exhibited toward externality-bearing parties outside of the market.  
Second, we consider the possibility that consumers may have limited information about 
which firms’ products are socially harmful, but that such information is often available if a 
consumer chooses to acquire it. In a setting where consumers are initially uninformed about the 
types of the offered products, we study both a case in which the information about external 
impact is free and one in which acquiring it involves the consumer incurring a small cost. In both 
cases, we find that the informational default has only a small effect—though slightly larger when 
acquiring information is costly—on the expression of social responsibility in the market. 
Third, we study the effect of an alternative production technology under which the cost of 
externality-free production is considerably higher. In our baseline market condition, this cost 
equals 20 percent of the surplus created for firms and consumers through exchange. We compare 
this with a condition in which firms and consumers must forgo 80 percent of this surplus to avoid 
imposing the externality. In this case, the market share of the socially responsible product 
decreases significantly, by about half, though this lower market share nevertheless remains stable 
throughout the experiment. This finding indicates that market participants respond to economic 
factors in deciding whether to act socially responsibly and provides a basis for understanding 
why the share of socially responsible trade is higher in some markets than others. 
To better understand the nature of preferences for social responsibility, we estimate 
choice models of consumer and firm behavior from our experimental data. For consumers, we 
estimate a conditional logit choice model (McFadden 1974) in which utility is determined both 
by a consumer’s own material payoff and by the social impact of a product purchase. We find 
that choices made by consumers in all market conditions demonstrate concern for both sources of 
utility, and that this concern is fairly stable. Thus, positive social impact can be modeled as a 
utility-enhancing product attribute that consumers compare to products’ relative prices. We also 
study firms’ product supply decisions, and find that firms, on average, respond sensibly to the 
expected relative profitability of the two types of products, but that their behavior also exhibits 
persistence, among some firms, in producing socially responsible products.  
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Hence, the experimental conditions above generally reveal significant and stable levels of 
socially responsible behavior in markets conducted in Switzerland. However, it is also important 
to identify the robustness of such behavior in other populations, particularly across societies with 
varying cultural values, market practices and historical trajectories in economic development. To 
this end, we report a second study, in which we compare socially responsible market behavior in 
our subject pool in Switzerland and a comparable subject pool in China. Concerns about social 
impact, such as environmental damage, are ubiquitous in discussions of China’s rapidly growing 
economy and, relatedly, there is debate regarding whether market behavior in China reflects less 
concern for morality and responsibility than in advanced Western economies (Ip 2009). Indeed, 
survey evidence suggests that notions of what constitutes “fair” behavior in markets may differ 
between Chinese and Western responders, with Chinese responses often judging deceitful and 
harmful business conduct less harshly (Ahmed et al. 2003; Lee et al. 2009; Gao 2009; Wong et 
al. 2010). However, to our knowledge, no empirical data directly tests whether the behavior of 
Chinese market participants exhibits less concern for social responsibility. Hence, our second 
study implements a replication of our baseline market, in Zurich and in Shanghai. In 
Switzerland, we almost exactly replicate the market share of the socially responsible product (48 
percent). In China, however, this market share is much lower, at 16 percent. The data thus reveal 
much less social responsibility in the experimental markets in China than in Switzerland.   
We also implement an experimental non-market condition, in which individuals in 
Switzerland and China make identical allocation choices, impacting themselves and two other 
participants, absent any market context. Consistent with prior research that finds no systematic 
differences when comparing pro-social behaviors in non-market contexts for Chinese and 
Western subjects (Buchan et al. 2006; Chuah et al. 2007; Bohnet et al., 2008; Herrmann et al. 
2008), we find no differences in the non-market context. This suggests that norms of socially 
responsible market behavior are weaker in our subject population in China than in Switzerland—
even though the measured propensity to act pro-socially outside of markets does not differ.  
Finally, to address the debate whether markets “corrupt” concern for social impact, we 
include conditions in both studies that allow us to directly compare the strength of the social 
concern exhibited by individual participants in our market environment with social concern 
expressed in a comparable dictator-like choice context. More precisely, we take choices faced by 
consumers in our baseline market condition and present exactly the same choices, without the 
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market context but with identical monetary consequences for the decision maker and for two 
other participants, to a new group of participants. Across three comparisons—one from each 
study in Switzerland and one from Study 2 in China—the frequency of choices mitigating the 
negative social impact on third parties in this non-market context is higher than in the market 
context, though the difference is smaller in Switzerland than in China. These observations are 
qualitatively in line with recent arguments that markets erode socially responsible behavior, 
relative to non-market contexts (e.g., Falk and Szech 2013), though our findings also indicate 
that social concern may be more robust to market contexts in some populations than in others. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section II reviews related literature. 
Section III describes the experimental design of our first study, conducted in Switzerland. 
Section IV presents the market shares and prices for the two types of products, while Section V 
presents analyses of individual firm and consumer behavior. Section VI contains the design and 
results of our second study, comparing socially responsible behavior in Switzerland and China. 
Section VII uses the combined data from both studies to compare consumer market behavior to 
individual allocation choices in comparable non-market contexts. Section VIII concludes.  
II. RELATED LITERATURE  
An extensive literature shows that experimental markets generally converge to 
equilibrium predictions in which considerations such as fairness have minimal impact, even 
when one side of the market captures all of the surplus (Smith 1962; Plott and Smith 1978; Smith 
and Williams 1982; Roth et al. 1991; Holt 1995; Franciosi et al. 1995) and when product 
purchases create negative externalities for other market participants (Plott 1983). While this data 
is often interpreted as evidence that social considerations are minimally important in markets, a 
key distinction between this and our work is that the kind of social impact we study deals not 
with fairness or inequality among directly interacting market participants—such as firms and 
consumers—but with concern for individuals entirely uninvolved with the market exchange 
process. This is the case, for example, when production and exchange yield widespread negative 
social impacts, such as environmental pollution, or harm to those unable to exert agency, as with 
labor coercion or animal testing. Our experiments find that concerns for such social impact can 
be persistently manifested in market behavior. 
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Our results also relate to a prominent argument that market exchange crowds out moral 
values (e.g., Sandel, 2012).3 Much of the evidence supporting this argument, however, is indirect 
and does not study the behavior of individuals interacting in markets. For example, experimental 
findings reveal that framing a non-market interaction with market terminology can reduce the 
importance of moral considerations among interacting participants (Hoffman et al. 1994; Ross 
and Ward 1996; Cappelen et al. 2013). Similarly, the act of assigning monetary value to “good” 
behaviors, through prices, can crowd out intrinsic motivations for such acts (Frey et al. 1996; 
Gneezy and Rustichini 2000; Mellström and Johannesson 2008). Moreover, priming people to 
think of money, in contrast with similar non-monetary primes, leads to more individualistic and 
less pro-social behavior (Vohs et al. 2006; see also, Kube et al. 2012). Thus, while there is 
considerable indirect evidence that suggests a perverting effect of market exchange, there is little 
direct evidence on whether moral considerations are truly eroded by market interaction.  
One exception is Falk and Szech (2013), who show that repeated interaction in bilateral 
and multi-lateral double-auction markets yields less socially responsible behavior than one-shot 
non-market decisions, measured by individuals’ willingness to accept 10 Euro for the death of a 
mouse. However, comparing only the extent to which outcomes that produce negative social 
impacts are generated by market and non-market contexts, the results of Falk and Szech show a 
limited negative impact of markets.4 Moreover, Falk and Szech’s comparison of market and non-
market decision making changes several aspects of the choice context simultaneously, making it 
difficult to interpret whether the change results from aspects unique to market vs. non-market 
comparisons.5 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Falk and Szech’s markets have only one 
production technology, which necessarily requires the imposition of a negative externality if 
exchange occurs. However, many real-world markets are characterized by a multiplicity of 
production technologies, some of which create fewer negative externalities than others. Indeed, a 
valuable aspect of markets is that, where a preference to employ a technology that limits external 
                                                            
3 A distinct argument is that the properties of markets make moral considerations indistinguishable from other 
motivations under certain conditions governing exchange (Sobel 2010; Dufwenberg et al. 2011).  
4 In Falk and Szech’s individual (non-market) condition, 45.9 percent of subjects accept a 10 Euro payment that kills 
a mouse, while in a bilateral market, 47.7 percent of possible trades that cause a mouse’s death occur. Both of these 
proportions are similar to the frequencies of social harm that we observe across many market conditions in our 
experiments. See also, Breyer and Weimann (2014) for further discussion of Falk and Szech’s data.  
5 For example, the non-market treatment involves a one-shot decision, without feedback, that unilaterally determines 
social outcomes, while the market context involves repeated decisions, with feedback on others’ behavior, in which 
parties jointly determine outcomes and responsibility is therefore diffused.  
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harm exists, market incentives and competition can encourage its adoption. Hence, our design 
allows social responsibility to be manifested in market exchange—as long as the trading parties 
are willing to bear the necessary costs. Thus, an important contribution of our work is to 
highlight the valuable role markets can play in generating socially responsible alternatives to 
harmful products—provided a feasible technology for doing so.  
Our findings also relate to research showing that markets and social concerns are 
compatible. For example, Henrich et al. (2001, 2010) find that exposure of developing societies 
to market interaction facilitates the adoption of pro-social norms. Our studies show, directly, that 
behavior consistent with such norms can persist as a feature of market exchange. In this sense, 
our work also relates to the literature showing that efficiency-enhancing reciprocity between 
buyers and sellers can persist in markets with incomplete contracts (Fehr et al. 1993; Fehr and 
Falk 1999). While the nature of these results is distinct from our work, in which contracts 
between buyers and sellers are complete, we establish the similar finding that social 
considerations can persist in competitive markets. 
Finally, our second experiment relates to work that measures differences in preferences 
and behavior between Chinese and Western individuals in non-market contexts (Buchan et al. 
2006; Chuah et al. 2007; Bohnet et al. 2008; Herrmann et al. 2008).6 This work shows that 
Chinese subjects tend to be, in general, no less pro-social than Western subjects—if anything, 
they may be slightly more pro-social. Close to our work are survey studies that document 
differing perceptions between Chinese and Western respondents regarding what constitutes 
ethical behavior in markets (Ahmed et al. 2003; Lee et al. 2009; Wong et al. 2010). For example, 
Gao (2009) analyzes survey responses collected in China and Switzerland using Kahneman et 
al.’s (1986) vignettes describing market behavior and eliciting judgments of the fairness or 
unfairness of the behavior, finding that Chinese respondents often rate egoistic market behaviors 
less harshly than respondents in Switzerland and Canada.7 Our study provides an empirical 
complement, by testing whether such perceptions are reflected in the behavior of participants in 
competitive markets.   
                                                            
6 A related paper (Kachelmeier and Shehata 1992) compares laboratory behavior in China and the United States, in 
double-auction markets with highly asymmetric equilibrium profits. Markets in both countries converge to 
equilibrium prices. Hence, the tendency for markets to eliminate concerns for equality between buyers and sellers, 
which we reviewed earlier, is present in China as well as in the United States.  
7 For example, for a scenario in which a landlord exploits a tenant’s inability to move in order to raise the rent, 91 
percent of Canadian respondents in Kahneman, et al.’s, original study judged the behavior as unfair, 92 percent of 
Swiss respondents did so, while only 63 percent of Chinese non-students and 80 percent of Chinese students did so. 
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III. STUDY 1: EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
III.A.   THE MARKET GAME  
 Our design develops a novel experimental market environment that contains important 
features of real-world product markets. Firms and consumers can exchange two types of 
products, one of which imposes a negative externality on a third party. For simplicity, we label 
the product that produces no externality (e ൌ 0), the socially responsible product, as the “fair” 
product and the product that generates a negative externality (e ൌ 1) as the “unfair” product.  
 Both product types are worth 50 to the consumer. The production cost of the unfair 
product is normalized to zero, thus generating a surplus of 50 to firms and consumers when 
exchanged. However, exchange of this product, which imposes a negative externality of 60 on a 
third party, is socially harmful and inefficient, with a net welfare impact of 50 െ 60 ൌ െ10. In 
contrast, the fair product has a production cost of ܿ ∈ ሺ0, 50ሻ that is borne by the firm, but has no 
impact on the third party. In most of our experimental conditions, ܿ ൌ 10. In all cases, exchange 
of the fair product is efficient, as it generates a net surplus of 50 െ c ൐ 0, which is greater than 
the net surplus of not trading (0) or of trading the unfair product ሺെ10). 
Our Market Baseline condition consists of six firms, five consumers and five third 
parties. All start with 100 units of wealth. Each firm offers a single product, either e ൌ 0 or 
e ൌ 1, in a posted-offer market, at a price, p, determined by that firm. The cost to the firm of 
producing a fair product is ܿ ൌ 10. After all firms select product types and prices, consumers 
enter the market sequentially in a randomly determined order, observe the current menu of prices 
and product types, and either choose a single product or reject all available offers. A firm can sell 
at most one product. Hence, while the consumer who enters the market first can choose among 
all six product offers, consumers who enter later only see and choose from the remaining offers. 
Since there are six firms but only five consumers, even the last consumer entering the market can 
choose from at least two product offers. There is, however, always at least one firm that cannot 
sell its product. Firms are informed about the product offers—type and price—of all firms in a 
period, the order in which offers are accepted, and thus also the offer(s) that remain unsold. The 
payoff of each of the five third parties is determined by one of the five possible market 
exchanges between firms and consumers. Specifically, the purchase of an unfair product by a 
consumer reduces a randomly selected third party’s payoff by 60 units, while either the purchase 
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of a fair product or a consumer’s decision not to purchase any product yield no impact on the 
corresponding third party’s payoff. Equations (1) to (3) summarize the payoffs in a period.8  
        Π௙௜௥௠ ൌ ቄ100 ൅ ݌ െ ሺ1 െ eሻ ∙ c100   
݂݅ ݂݅ݎ݉ ݏ݈݈݁ݏ ݅ݐݏ ݌ݎ݋݀ݑܿݐ ܽݐ	݌ݎ݅ܿ݁	݌	
݋ݐ݄݁ݎݓ݅ݏ݁  (1) 
 Π௖௢௡௦௨௠௘௥ ൌ ቄ100 ൅ 50 െ ݌100   
݂݅ ܿ݋݊ݏݑ݉݁ݎ ܾݑݕݏ ܽ ݌ݎ݋݀ݑܿݐ	ܽݐ	݌ݎ݅ܿ݁	݌
݋ݐ݄݁ݎݓ݅ݏ݁  (2) 
Π௧௛௥௜ௗ	௣௔௥௬ ൌ ቄ100 െ 60 ∙ ݁100  
݂݅ ݉ܽݐ݄ܿ݁݀ ݓ݅ݐ݄ ܽ݊ ݁ݔ݄ܿܽ݊݃݁݀	݌ݎ݋݀ݑܿݐ
݋ݐ݄݁ݎݓ݅ݏ݁  (3) 
Subjects play 24 rounds of the market game in fixed groups (16-person markets) and 
roles. We eliminate the possibility of cross-period reputation by not showing subjects the ID 
numbers of other market participants and by randomly ordering the display of product offers in 
each period. One round is randomly chosen for payment at the end of the experiment. Each third 
party is randomly matched to the purchasing decision realized by a particular consumer. 
We introduce an explicit market context in the instructions. Players A are described as 
“sellers” and Players B as “buyers” and they are told they can “trade” different “types of 
products” at the offered “prices.” Player C is neutrally described as “Player C,” and the two types 
of products are called “product without impact on player C” (in case of ݁ ൌ 0) and “product with 
loss for player C” (in case of ݁ ൌ 1). An English translation of the original German instructions 
for the Market Baseline condition is included in Online Appendix F. 
III.B.   VARYING MARKET AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHARACTERISTICS 
 To study the robustness of socially responsible market behavior, Study 1 implements 
additional market variants, each of which changes one characteristic of the market. Specifically, 
we vary (i) the degree of competition between firms in the market, (ii) the information that 
consumers have about the types of available products, and (iii) the cost of becoming informed 
about the characteristics of products. Moreover, we also implement a variation in the production 
technology by (iv) increasing the production cost of the fair product. 
 First, in a High Firm Competition condition, we increase the number of firms from six to 
eight. Apart from this difference, this condition is identical to the Market Baseline. We expect 
                                                            
8 Note that the production costs (when ݁ ൌ 0) and the externality (when ݁ ൌ 1) arise only if a product is sold, which 
can be interpreted as a “production on demand” technology. We chose this design feature to create a situation in 
which exchange between buyers and sellers creates the externality.  
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this increased competition between firms will lead to prices closer to competitive equilibrium 
than in the Market Baseline, as posted-offer markets typically yield prices above competitive 
equilibrium (Plott and Smith, 1978). Our primary focus, however, is on how this increased 
competition affects social responsibility, e.g., the market share of the fair product. 
Second, we conduct two Limited Information conditions, in which consumers initially 
have no information regarding the types of different products. Consumers initially only observe 
the price of each available product, though they are aware that the products might vary based on 
their social impact. In both conditions, consumers have the opportunity, in each period, to learn 
the social impact of all available products after observing the prices. If they decide not to acquire 
this information, they never become informed about the product types in that period, not even 
about the impact of any product they might purchase. The two conditions vary how costly it is 
for consumers to become informed. In the Limited Information (Free) condition, a consumer can 
reveal the product types at no monetary cost, simply by clicking a button. Apart from the fact 
that consumers do not learn the types of products by default when entering the market, this 
condition is identical to the Market Baseline. However, it allows us to identify whether an 
alternative, perhaps more natural, informational default affects socially responsible behavior and 
market outcomes. In the Limited Information (Costly) condition a consumer has to pay a small 
cost of 1 unit if she chooses to reveal the types of the available products before making a 
purchasing decision in a period. This adds the realistic feature that it is often (minimally) costly 
for consumers to become informed about the social impact of available products.  
Finally, in the High Production Cost condition, we increase the production cost of the fair 
product to ܿ ൌ 40, in contrast with the production cost of ܿ ൌ 10 in the Market Baseline. The 
High Production Cost condition thus implements a technological change from the Market 
Baseline, in terms of the cost of mitigating the externality, but is otherwise identical.  
III.C.   THE NO MARKET CONDITION 
 The above experimental conditions all study the prevalence of concern for social impact 
under varying market and technological conditions. To provide a non-market benchmark against 
which to compare the degree of such concern, we conducted a No Market condition. This 
condition mimics standard distributional decision tasks (i.e., dictator games) typically used to 
measure concerns for fairness and social impact in individual choice experiments.  
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Our novel design creates a precise parallel between the monetary consequences of the 
product choices made by consumers in a given round in the Market Baseline and the allocation 
choices made by decision makers in our No Market condition. To achieve this, we present each 
decision maker in the No Market condition with the exact sequence of choices faced by a yoked 
consumer in the Market Baseline. That is, for each consumer in the Market Baseline, who faced 
a sequence of 24 menus of product offers, we have a decision maker in the No Market condition 
who faces a sequence of 24 identical, in monetary terms, neutrally framed allocation choices.  
 We implement three-person groups (Players “A,” “B,” and “C”), in which Players B 
(corresponding to consumers in our market conditions) choose between different allocations of 
payoffs among all three players. Players A and C are thus inactive in this condition and 
correspond, implicitly, to the roles of firms and third parties in the market condition.9 The 
assignment of subjects to roles is fixed for the 24 rounds. As in the Market Baseline, one of the 
24 rounds is randomly chosen to determine payoffs at the end of a session.  
Our design compares the behavior of individuals—in the roles of “consumers” or as 
neutrally framed decision makers—between market and non-market settings. Specifically, we 
aim to study the tradeoffs people make between personal benefits and the welfare of others in 
two very distinct and important settings: an individual choice context similar to the widely 
studied dictator game and a context designed to simulate consumer choice in product markets. 
For this purpose, we employ a design that allows us to identify differences in individuals’ 
preferences between the two contexts, measured by choices among consequentially identical sets 
of alternatives. By holding the monetary consequences of these choices constant, while also 
keeping the choice procedures and interface very similar, our design creates a clear basis for this 
comparison, relative to one in which we change more features of the choice environments.10 
                                                            
9 For example, suppose a consumer in Market Baseline can choose between three different products: (i) one fair 
product at price, ݌ ൌ 30, (ii) one fair product at price, ݌ ൌ 25, and (iii) one unfair product at price, ݌ ൌ 15. There is 
also always the option (iv) not to buy a product at all. Then, the corresponding four allocation options for a Player B 
in the No Market condition are: (i) 120 for Player A (100 ൅ 30 െ 10), 120 for Player B (100 ൅ 50 െ 30), and 100 
for Player C (100 െ 0); (ii) 115 for A (100 ൅ 25 െ 10), 125 for B (100 ൅ 50 െ 25), and 100 for C (100 െ 0); (iii) 
115 for A (100 ൅ 15 െ 0), 135 for B (100 ൅ 50 െ 15), and 40 for C (100 െ 60); and (iv) 100 for each player.  
10 For example, an alternative approach might compare our Market Baseline to a non-market condition in which a 
single subject plays the role of firm and consumer and can choose among all payoff combinations (price and product 
type) available in our market setting. Such a design, by taking a decision collectively produced by multiple subjects 
(firms and consumers) and making it the responsibility of a single subject, would essentially test diffusion of 
responsibility. Extensive evidence documents that diffused responsibility significantly decreases concern for social 
impact, even in contexts not involving markets (Darley and Latane, 1968; Dana, et al., 2007; Hamman, et al., 2010).  
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III.D.   PREDICTIONS  
The standard economic assumptions of self-interest and rationality yield the same 
prediction for all the market conditions: all consumers purchase the unfair product, which is 
traded at a price of zero. The resulting outcomes are maximally inefficient, since each unit of the 
unfair good traded results in a net social loss.  
Our experiment also allows the possibility of socially responsible behavior, reflected in 
market shares and prices. If concern for social impact is a persistent characteristic of market 
participants’ preferences, and such concern is sufficiently strong, then we expect positive and 
constant market shares for the fair product.11 
III.E.   GENERAL INFORMATION AND PROCEDURES  
All sessions took place at the computer laboratory of the Department of Economics at the 
University of Zurich. Subjects were mainly students from the University of Zurich and the Swiss 
Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich. Students majoring in economics or psychology were 
not eligible to participate. Study 1 employed a total of 613 participants in a between-subjects 
design; that is, each subject participated in only one condition. Table I gives an overview of our 
treatment conditions and the number of observations. We conducted between 6 and 7 
independent markets for each market condition, each using between 96 and 112 subjects. We 
also conducted 3 sessions of the No Market condition, with 105 subjects.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
The study was conducted using the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Before entering 
the lab, each subject randomly drew a place card that specified at which computer terminal to sit. 
The terminal number determined a subject’s role. Subjects received written instructions, 
including comprehension questions that had to be answered correctly before a session began. An 
                                                            
11 Online Appendix A provides a straightforward application of a standard model of social preferences (Fehr and 
Schmidt, 1999) to our setting. The model predicts that consumers and firms sufficiently concerned with fairness and 
inequality are willing to bear additional costs for socially responsible products that do not harm the third party. The 
model also predicts a decreased market share for the fair product as the cost of mitigating the externality, c, 
increases, but the predicted market share is insensitive to increased firm competition and costless limited 
information (and also essentially insensitive to very small information costs). Research on social concern in non-
market environments shows that many people exploit default informational states to act self-interestedly (Dana et al. 
2007). While inconsistent with most social preference models, such behavior raises the possibility that consumers 
with limited information will similarly exploit a state of default ignorance about product types. 
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experimenter read a summary of the instructions aloud to ensure common information about 
actions, payoffs and procedures.  
Sessions lasted about 1.5 hours. Payoffs from the experiment, denominated in “points,” 
were converted into money at the rate of 10 points to CHF 2.50 (CHF 1 ≈ $ 1 at the time of the 
study). On average, subjects earned about CHF 42.0, which includes a show-up fee of CHF 15.  
IV.   STUDY 1: MARKET SHARES AND PRICES 
We first present the results of the Market Baseline, to identify the extent to which 
concern for social impact is reflected in market outcomes, i.e., market shares and relative prices. 
Then, we study how varying market and technological conditions—increased firm competition, 
limited consumer information, and increased production costs—influence social responsibility. 
In Section V, we shift our attention to the individual behavior of consumers and firms.  
We defer a comparison of the Market Baseline and No Market conditions to Section VII, 
after presenting Study 2 in Section VI. This is because Study 2 also includes identical market and 
non-market conditions, and we thus present a more thorough analysis using the combined data. 
IV.A.   MARKET BASELINE  
In 99 percent of cases (831 of 840 consumer choices), consumers purchased a product. 
Therefore, our analysis will primarily focus on the realized purchases by consumers; unless 
otherwise noted, we ignore cases in which a consumer made no product purchase.  
The solid line in Figure I displays the proportion of fair products purchased by consumers 
across time in the Market Baseline. This statistic identifies how often the externality on third 
parties was mitigated and, therefore, corresponds to the efficiency of the market. To smooth 
random variation across periods, we report data aggregated in three-period blocks. The figure 
reveals a large and stable share of fair products in the Market Baseline. This share is 50 percent 
in the first three periods, then decreases slightly, but remains between 42 and 46 percent in all 
remaining three-period blocks. The overall market share of fair products in the Market Baseline 
is 44.3 percent.12 Thus, as measured by product purchases, we observe a persistent manifestation 
                                                            
12 When a consumer’s choice set included at least one product of each type, the frequency of fair product purchases 
is slightly higher (48.1 percent). We also compare purchases based on whether consumers were randomly selected to 
choose earlier (when there were more product options available) or later in a period. When consumers observed all 6 
product offers, including at least one product of each type, 45.3 percent purchased fair products. When consumers 
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of socially responsible behavior in market exchange, with almost half of realized trades revealing 
an apparent concern for avoiding the imposition of the externality.  
[Insert Figure I about here] 
Table II reports probit regressions, with subject random effects, of consumers’ product 
choices. All models include period as an explanatory variable; the coefficient for this variable is 
never statistically significant. Model 2 introduces an explanatory variable measuring the size of 
the choice set available to the consumer (recall that consumers acting later saw subsets of the 
original product offers), which has no effect on the frequency of fair product choices.13 Model 3 
restricts the data to cases in which a consumer saw both types of products, again finding no time 
trend. Model 4 reveals that consumers respond sensibly to prices: they are less likely to purchase 
a fair product as the lowest price at which one is available rises and, conversely, they are more 
likely to buy a fair product as the lowest price at which an unfair product is available increases.  
[Insert Table II about here] 
Consumers’ concern for social impact is also reflected in a persistent price difference for 
the two types of products. Products that produce no social harm trade at higher prices than 
socially harmful products throughout the experiment. This price premium increases over time, 
from 2.7 in the first six periods to 4.8 in the final six periods.14 This trend is illustrated by the 
solid line in Figure II, which shows the price premium for the fair product—i.e., the mean price 
of the fair product minus the mean price of the unfair product—in the Market Baseline condition. 
By the end of the experiment, when the price premium is approximately 5, the 10-unit cost of 
mitigating the externality is thus borne equally by sellers and buyers. The observation that the 
average price premium is below the additional cost of producing the socially responsible product 
reflects firms’ concern for social impact.15 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
observed only 2 product offers (i.e., a consumer was last to act) this frequency is 42.5 percent. The small difference 
suggests that consumers did not strategically alter their behavior to influence choice sets of later-acting consumers. 
13 Alternatively, if we construct binary variables for whether a consumer saw 2, 3, 4, 5 or 6 product offers, and use 
these variables instead, none of the coefficients is statistically significant. 
14 Average prices in the first six periods are 28.7 for the fair product and 26 for the unfair product; these averages 
decrease to 25.7 and 20.9, respectively, by the final six periods. Online Appendix B provides time series graphs of 
prices for all market conditions. 
15 Offering the fair product led to lower expected profits for firms—the average profit for firms offering fair 
products was 114.2, while it was 119.1 for firms offering unfair products—but a significant proportion of firms’ 
product offers (44.1 percent) were nevertheless fair. The proportion of fair product offers by firms differs little 
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As a complement to the above qualitative description of the price pattern, Table III 
reports regressions that study how prices vary over time and by product type. Model 1 reports 
estimates using data from the Market Baseline condition and reveals that the general price 
decrease across time is significant, that the fair product sells at a significantly higher price, and 
that the gap between the two prices increases over time.  
[Insert Table III about here] 
RESULT 1: Outcomes in the Market Baseline condition reveal a significant and stable 
concern by consumers and firms for the welfare of the third party, reflected both in 
market share and in relative prices for the two kinds of products.  
IV.B.   INCREASED FIRM COMPETITION  
Our second market condition increases the number of firms, from 6 to 8, thereby 
increasing competition and likely putting downward pressure on prices. Returning to Figure I, 
the dotted line shows that the High Firm Competition condition yields a slightly higher 
frequency of fair products, relative to the Market Baseline. Specifically, the overall market share 
of fair products increases from 44 percent to 54 percent. Models 1 and 2 in Table IV report the 
results of random-effects probit regressions of the type of product purchased, comparing the 
Market Baseline and High Firm Competition conditions. Model 1 shows no significant 
difference between the Market Baseline (omitted category) and High Firm Competition 
conditions, in terms of overall fair product market shares. Model 2 additionally tests for 
differences in condition-specific time trends, again revealing no significant treatment effects.  
[Insert Table IV about here] 
We also observe the price premium for the fair product that we found in the Market 
Baseline condition. Reflecting basic economic forces, increased competition lowers prices for 
both types of products (see Figure B.1 in the Online Appendix). More importantly, for our 
purposes, the price difference for the two types of products persists under High Firm 
Competition and, if anything, is slightly greater; this is apparent in the dotted line in Figure II. 
The price premium for the fair product increases to about 8 near the end of the experiment under 
High Firm Competition, which is higher than in the Market Baseline and close to the marginal 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
between the first (43.1 percent) and second (45.2 percent) halves of the experiment. The probability of having an 
offer accepted was similar for both fair (83 percent) and unfair (82 percent) product offers. 
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production cost for firms. Nevertheless, many consumers are willing to pay the greater price 
premium for the fair product, as indicated by the market share in Figure I.  
[Insert Figure II about here] 
Returning to Table III, in Model 2, we see that the lower prices with High Firm 
Competition are reflected in the smaller coefficient for the constant term, relative to the Market 
Baseline. We also observe the persistent price premium for fair products, reflected in the positive 
and significant coefficient for that variable and for the interaction term with Period, both of 
which are higher under High Firm Competition than for the Market Baseline.  
RESULT 2: Outcomes in the High Firm Competition condition reveal a significant and stable 
concern for the welfare of the third party, reflected in both market shares and relative 
prices for the two kinds of products. Increased firm competition lowers prices relative 
to the Market Baseline. Socially responsible behavior is slightly, but statistically 
insignificantly, higher under High Firm Competition than in the Market Baseline. 
IV.C.   LIMITED CONSUMER INFORMATION 
We next analyze the case in which consumers initially possess limited information about 
the types of the different available products in a period, but have the opportunity to acquire such 
information, either for free or at a small cost. The lines of varying dash length in Figure I show 
that under Limited Information, the overall market shares of fair products across all periods 
decreases to about 40 percent, for both conditions, slightly lower than the 44 percent in the 
Market Baseline. Looking at the second half of the experiment, where time trends are fairly flat, 
the fair product market shares are ordered in the manner one would expect—highest in the 
Market Baseline, lower with Free Limited Information and lowest under Costly Limited 
Information—but with differences that are not very large in magnitude. Models 3 to 6 in Table 
IV provide statistical comparisons of product market shares in the Market Baseline with the two 
Limited Information conditions. Models 3 and 5 show that there are no significant differences in 
market shares, for either of the two Limited Information conditions. Models 4 and 6 additionally 
show that there are also no significant differences in time trends.  
A persistent concern for the welfare of the third party is again also reflected in the 
relative prices of the two product types. The two varying-length dashed lines in Figure II show 
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an increasing price premium for the fair product in both Limited Information conditions. 
Returning to Table III, Models 3 and 4 present coefficient estimates for random-effects 
regressions of price on product type and across time for the two conditions. The price premium 
for the fair product is statistically significant throughout the experiment and significantly 
increasing for Free Limited Information, a similar pattern as in the Market Baseline. Under 
Costly Limited Information, the price premium increases marginally significantly over time, but 
the overall difference only becomes statistically significant after a few periods.16  
RESULT 3: Outcomes in both Limited Information conditions reveal a significant and stable 
concern for the welfare of the third party, reflected both in market shares and in 
relative prices for the two kinds of products. Relative to the Market Baseline, the 
concern for the welfare of the third party, manifested in purchasing behavior, is 
slightly, but not significantly, reduced when acquiring product information is costly. 
 Consumers in the Limited Information (Free) condition acquired product information 73 
percent of the time, while information acquisition in the Limited Information (Costly) condition 
is less frequent (42 percent). These frequencies are fairly stable across time. Moreover, 
information acquisition appears to be instrumental. Consumers who do not acquire information 
end up purchasing unfair products 87 percent of the time.17 Conversely, a large majority of 
consumers who pay for information purchase fair products. Thus, information use appears 
generally sensible, with those consumers interested in acting socially responsibly acquiring and 
using the information and those less concerned with social impact simply remaining uninformed 
and purchasing the least expensive product.  
IV.D.   HIGH PRODUCTION COST 
Finally, we consider the market with a high production cost for the socially responsible 
product. In this condition, the marginal cost of producing the socially responsible product equals 
40 units, or 80 percent of the surplus from exchange, four times higher than in other conditions.  
                                                            
16 Specifically, statistical rejection of the condition that, Fair Product + t * Period X Fair Product = 0, based on the 
estimates in Model 3, reaches a level of significance of p = 0.05 (χ2(1) = 3.77) in period t = 3.  
17 While consumers who do not acquire information in either condition do not know (and are not informed, ex post) 
which type of product they are purchasing, they almost always purchase the cheapest product available, which is 
typically an unfair product. The high level of product type information implicit in offer prices might partly explain 
the small effect of consumers’ limited information on market outcomes. In Online Appendix C, we provide a more 
detailed analysis of consumers’ information acquisition and subsequent purchase decisions. 
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 The dashed line in Figure I shows that this increase in the cost of producing the socially 
responsible product leads to a considerably lower market share: 24 percent across all periods, 
close to half of that in the Market Baseline. Models 7 and 8 in Table IV provide statistical 
comparisons of fair product market shares in the Market Baseline and High Production Cost 
conditions. Consistent with Figure I, the latter yields significantly lower frequencies of fair 
products, with no time trend in either condition. Thus, while previous changes to the market—
increased competition and limited information—had little effect on the fair product market share, 
making the fair product more costly to produce has a much larger impact. However, it is also 
noteworthy that the market share of fair products remains constant throughout the experiment, 
revealing stability in socially responsible behavior—though at a lower level—similar to that in 
the Market Baseline.18  
 As is evident in Figure II, there is again a persistent and increasing price premium for the 
fair product. Not surprisingly, the price premium is higher with High Production Costs—close to 
14 units over the entire experiment—than in the other market conditions. As with our other 
market conditions, however, the average price premium remains below the full cost of socially 
responsible production, meaning that firms and consumers share the burden of implementing 
socially responsible outcomes.19 
RESULT 4: Outcomes in the High Production Cost condition reveal a significant and stable 
concern for the welfare of the third party, reflected both in market shares and in 
relative prices for the two kinds of products. With High Production Cost, the price 
premium for the fair product is higher and the market share for the fair product is 
significantly lower than in the Market Baseline. 
V. STUDY 1: INDIVIDUAL CONSUMER AND FIRM BEHAVIOR 
Our analysis thus far has focused on aggregate market outcomes—product shares and 
prices—as a way of studying socially responsible market behavior. We next shift our attention to 
                                                            
18 The high production cost increases, slightly, the frequency with which consumers opt not to buy a product, from 1 
percent in the Market Baseline to 4.7 across all periods, and 3.9 percent in the second half of the experiment. A 
random-effects probit regression of no-purchase choices on High Production Cost condition, period, and the 
interaction of these two variables reveals no significant difference between the High Production Cost and Market 
Baseline conditions. The frequency of no-purchase choices is low (3.5 percent or below) in all other conditions. 
19 The application of the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model in Online Appendix A predicts both the lower market share 
of fair products and the smaller relative price premium in the High Production Cost condition.  
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the individual behavior of consumers and firms. If market outcomes truly reflect socially 
responsible behavior, then such concern should show up as part of a sensible dimension of the 
decision making of market participants. Moreover, average preferences for social responsibility 
should be relatively similar across market environments, even when behavior changes in 
response to market factors like prices and costs. 
V.A.   CONSUMER BEHAVIOR 
We assume that individuals potentially care both about their own material payoff and 
about the social impact of their product choice. A simple way to capture such preferences is with 
a linear utility function of the form, ݑ ൌ 	ߠ	ݔ ൅ 	ߛ	ݕ, where ߠ ൐ 0 represents the weight that 
consumers place on their own monetary payoff (value of the product purchased minus the price 
paid), indicated by x, and ߛ captures their concern, or social responsibility, for the third party, 
whose payoff is indicated by y. Thus, for example, consumers with ߛ	 ൌ 	0 care only about 
buying the product at the lowest price, while consumers for whom 0 ൏ ߩ	ߠ ൌ ߛ are willing to 
sacrifice up to ߩ units of own wealth for a one unit increase in the third party’s wealth. 
We estimate the weights in the above utility specification, using McFadden’s (1974) 
conditional logit choice model. Specifically, Table V reports coefficient estimates for utility 
functions of the form, 
ݑ௜௧௝ ൌ ߠ	ݔ௜௧௝ ൅ ߛ	ݕ௜௧௝ ൅ ൫∑ ߙ௝௞	ݖ௜௧௞௄௞ୀଵ ൯ ൅	߳௜௧௝, 
which describe the utility to a consumer, ݅ , in period ݐ , from product alternative, ݆ ∈
൛0, 1, 2,⋯ , ܬ௜௧ൟ, where ܬ௜௧  is the number of product alternatives available. The option not to 
purchase a product, which is always available, corresponds to ݆	 ൌ 	0, and the actual number of 
product offers observed by the consumer is indicated by 2 ൑ ܬ௜௧ ൑ 	6, except for High Firm 
Competition, where 4 ൑ 	 ܬ௜௧ ൑ 	8 . The variables, ݖ௜௧௞ , correspond to ܭ  variables that vary 
between cases (i.e., between subjects and periods), but not across alternatives in a case. 
Specifically, in our estimated models, ܭ	 ൌ 	3, corresponding to period, female gender and (the 
natural logarithm of) age. Because the labeling of the different product options is irrelevant in 
our experiment (product choice options were unlabeled and were presented in random order), 
except for the option not to purchase a product in a period (which was always available and 
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uniquely identifiable), we impose the restriction that ߙ௝௞ ൌ ߙ௝ᇲ௞ , for all ݆, ݆ᇱ ് 0. Finally, ߳௜௧௝ 
corresponds to an idiosyncratic extreme-value (logit) random utility error.  
 Model 1 in Table V reports the coefficient estimates for ߠ and ߛ, for the Market Baseline 
condition.20 Consumers care both about their own monetary payoff (ߠ > 0) and about the welfare 
of the third party (ߛ ൐ 0).21  Thus, the apparent social concern that we observe in aggregate 
market outcomes is also apparent in the purchasing behavior of individual consumers. Moreover, 
the ratio of the two coefficients can be interpreted as the relative concern that the average 
consumer places on her own payoff versus the payoff of the third party. In the case of the Market 
Baseline, this ratio is approximately 11, suggesting that, on average, consumers are willing to 
sacrifice one unit of wealth to benefit the third party by 11 units. 
[Insert Table V about here] 
 The remaining models all introduce condition-specific intercept terms to measure the 
extent to which concern for social impact differs in each condition, relative to the Market 
Baseline. Specifically, Models 2 through 5 each use data from the Market Baseline and one 
additional market condition, and introduce an interaction term between condition and third-party 
earnings, to measure differential concern for the welfare of the third party. Model 6 includes data 
from all market conditions and simultaneously estimates all the condition-specific interaction 
terms. The estimates reveal fairly stable concern for social impact across most market conditions, 
with interaction coefficient estimates that are typically small, positive (indicating, if anything, 
increased concern for social impact), and generally statistically insignificant. The lone exception 
is the Limited Information (Costly) condition. When consumers have to pay for information 
about the social impact of their purchases, their purchasing behavior reflects decreased concern 
                                                            
20 The table omits the case-specific intercept terms (ߙ௝௞). Selecting not to make a product purchase is generally 
infrequent. However, the coefficient estimates suggest that consumers tended to make the no-purchase option more 
frequently later in the experiment and as they reported an older age, though these are not always statistically 
significant. Omitting these intercept terms from the estimated models does not substantively change the results. 
21 We chose a simple utility framework with direct concern for the third party’s payoff for simplicity. If, instead, for 
comparability with the theoretical analysis in Online Appendix A, we modify the estimated model to reflect concern 
for inequality with respect to the third party, the nature and statistical strength of the results are identical to those in 
Table V. Also for simplicity, we assume that consumers do not care about the firm’s wealth. As we note earlier, 
prior experimental evidence suggests that fairness between market participants is often extinguished in repeated 
market exchange (Kachelmeier, et al., 1991; Francoisi, et al., 1995). Indeed, we confirm this to be the case in our 
data: if we conduct the estimation in this section and additionally include firm profits, the result is a statistically 
insignificant coefficient for the firm’s profit, but no substantive change to any of the other results. 
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for the welfare of the third party.22  However, if we estimate the model separately for this 
condition alone, the coefficients for both Consumer Earnings and Third Party Earnings are 
positive and highly statistically significant (θ = 0.575 (0.010); γ = 0.024 (0.005); both p < 0.001). 
Thus, while apparent concern for social impact appears lower in this condition, it is nevertheless 
present. The overall pattern of stable preferences is striking, and observable quite clearly in 
Model 6. The same estimated utility weights characterize behavior across all five market 
conditions: we fail to reject a test of the restriction that all four interaction terms in Model 6 
jointly equal zero (߯ଶሺ4ሻ = 6.06, p = 0.195). These results are especially interesting in light of 
the lower market share of the fair product in the High Production Cost condition because they 
reveal that this behavioral change occurs without substantive changes in the estimated underlying 
consumer preferences. This suggests that subjects’ preferences for positive social impact are a 
stable mechanism driving behavior in all market conditions. 
RESULT 5: Consumer’s purchasing behavior reflects concern for both the price and the 
social impact of the product and this concern is fairly stable across all market 
conditions. Compared to the Market Baseline, social concern among consumers, 
relative to self-interest, is lower only in the Limited Information (Costly) condition. 
V.B.   FIRM BEHAVIOR 
We also study the decisions of individual firms regarding which type of product to 
produce. Table VI reports random-effects probit regression results, using as the dependent 
variable whether a firm chose to offer a fair (1) or unfair (0) product in a period.  
[Insert Table VI about here] 
 Model 1 reveals no differences between conditions in the tendency of firms to offer fair 
products, with the exception of the High Production Cost condition, where firms offer fair 
products significantly less frequently. This concords with the general pattern in Figure I. Model 2 
studies the effect of a variable that identifies whether a firm offered a fair product in the previous 
                                                            
22 The estimated model ignores the information-acquisition stage and associated cost, i.e., we implicitly assume such 
costs are zero, and that consumers know the product characteristics. In principle, one could estimate a model that 
includes the endogenous information acquisition decision, but this requires assumptions regarding beliefs held by 
consumers about the characteristics of different products, based on observed prices. Given the ad hoc nature of such 
assumptions, we limit our analysis to a comparison of product purchases based on the known (to the experimenter) 
characteristics of products and ignore the (small) utility implications of costly information acquisition. 
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period. The positive and statistically significant coefficient suggests a tendency to repeatedly 
offer the same product type across periods. Model 3 adds as an explanatory variable a simple 
measure of the relative expected profitability of the two product types. Specifically, we calculate, 
for each period in a market, the average realized profit in the prior period for firms that offered 
the fair product minus the average realized profit for firms that offered the unfair product, 
including profits of 100 for firms with unsold product offers. This measure identifies how much 
more (or less) firms earned by offering the fair product than by offering the unfair one. The 
positive and significant coefficient for this variable indicates that firms respond to the prior 
relative profitability of the two kinds of products, becoming more likely to offer a fair product as 
such products become relatively more profitable.  
 Finally, Model 4 jointly incorporates all the above variables. The type of product offered 
by the firm in the prior period and the expected profitability of the fair product retain their 
statistical significance, and the magnitude of the coefficients remains similar to that in Models 2 
and 3. However, the treatment effect for High Production Cost decreases substantially in 
magnitude and is no longer statistically significant. Thus, while Model 1 indicates a treatment 
effect of High Production Costs on firm decision making, Model 4 reveals that this is largely 
accounted for by the impact of the higher production costs on expected firm profits. 
RESULT 6: Firms offer more fair products when such products are more profitable. This 
difference in expected profitability accounts for differences in the frequencies of fair 
product offers by firms across market conditions. Firms, on average, show a tendency 
to repeat prior product type choices. 
V.C.   CONSUMER AND FIRM HETEROGENEITY 
The above analyses obscure potentially significant individual differences in concern for 
social impact. Indeed, individual choice experiments—e.g., using dictator games—usually reveal 
heterogeneous concerns for fairness (Camerer, 2003; Engel, 2011). Online Appendix D presents 
histograms showing how often each individual consumer and firm purchased or offered a fair 
product, across the entire experiment. The results reveal significant heterogeneity. In all 
conditions, large proportions of subjects—roughly 50 percent in the second half of the 
experiment—never change their behavior, meaning they either always or never purchase or offer 
a fair product. The remaining subjects are fairly dispersed in their behavior, exchanging fair 
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products with varying frequency, which is consistent with the price and expected profit 
sensitivity that we identified in the previous two sections.  
VI. STUDY 2: MARKET AND NON-MARKET BEHAVIOR IN 
SWITZERLAND AND CHINA  
Our first study shows that many market participants, in Switzerland, take into account the 
external impacts of their market activity. We next explore possible variation across societies in 
social responsibility, by conducting a second study jointly in Switzerland and China. 
VI.A.   DESIGN 
The primary focus of our study consists of sessions of the Market Baseline condition, 
conducted as described in Section III.A, in Switzerland and China. In these Market Switzerland 
and Market China conditions, five consumers and six firms interacted exactly as in Study 1, with 
their market behavior potentially affecting five third parties. 
Aside from measuring social concern in markets using subject pools in Switzerland and 
China, we also obtain comparable measures of social concern in non-market contexts in both 
subject pools. This helps us identify, for example, whether any difference in market socially 
responsible behavior between the two populations is due to a more general difference in social 
preferences, or whether the market context has different effects in the two subject pools. Hence, 
we also conducted sessions of the No Market condition, as described in Section III.C, in both 
Switzerland and China.23  
However, while the No Market condition in a country is directly comparable to the 
corresponding country’s Market condition, the No Market conditions are not directly comparable 
across countries because the choice sets provided to the two sets of non-market decision makers 
in the two countries differ. Therefore, we also conducted a “swapped” variant of the No Market 
condition in which we provided decision makers in a No Market session conducted in 
Switzerland (Swapped No Market Switzerland) with a sequence of 24 choices faced by paired 
consumers in the Market China condition. Similarly, we provided subjects in the Swapped No 
Market China condition with the choices faced by consumers in the Market Switzerland 
                                                            
23 For example, in the No Market China condition, a subject in the role of decision maker (Player B) made 24 
allocation choices identical to those faced by a consumer in the Market China condition. 
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condition. Hence, conducting these Swapped No Market conditions creates a way to directly 
compare non-market behavior across the two subject pools.24  
At the end of each session, we also administered the Fair Market Ideology scale 
developed by Jost et al. (2003). This questionnaire measures whether individuals perceive free 
markets as a fair system and whether inequality produced by markets is fair. We included this 
scale to test whether, consistent with prior research, Chinese respondents tend to judge market 
behavior that produces inequality less harshly than respondents in Switzerland (cf. Gao 2009). 
VI.B.   GENERAL INFORMATION AND PROCEDURES 
We conducted the study at the University of Zurich and the Shanghai University of 
Finance and Economics. A total of 616 subjects participated, half in China and half in 
Switzerland. More precisely, 128 subjects participated in 8 Market sessions in each country, 40 
in the role of consumer. Additionally, 120 subjects participated in the No Market condition in 
each country, 40 in the role of decision maker. These 40 subjects received the exact choice sets 
faced by consumers in the same country’s Market condition. In each country, we also collected 
Swapped No Market observations for a representative subsample of 4 markets from the 
respective other country. This required 60 subjects in each country, 20 in the role of decision 
maker.  
 The general procedures were as described in Section III.E. After conducting sessions in 
China, which recruited from the broad student population at the Shanghai University of Finance 
and Economics, we recruited from a comparable distribution of study majors in Zurich—roughly 
50 percent from the fields of finance, economics and business (Study 2 thus uses a slightly 
different population for the Zurich sessions than Study 1). To ensure comparability between the 
two sets of instructions, we employed a back-translation procedure in writing the Mandarin 
version of the experimental instructions—one person translated the English instructions into 
Mandarin and another person back into English, to identify and reconcile inconsistencies. The 
conversion from points into money aims to match the purchasing power of subjects’ payoffs: 
points were converted into money at the rate of 10 points to CNY 2.5 in Shanghai and, as in 
Study 1, 10 points to CHF 2.50 in Switzerland. On average, subjects in China earned about CNY 
                                                            
24 For example, a decision maker in China (Swapped No Market China condition) and one in Switzerland (No 
Market Switzerland condition) are provided with the same 24 allocation choices in a non-market context. These 
choices are identical to the 24 product choices faced by a market consumer in the Market Switzerland condition. 
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40.7, including a show-up fee of CNY 15; subjects in Switzerland earned about CHF 41.3, 
including a show-up fee of CHF 15. 
VI.C.   RESULTS 
We first consider responses to the Fair Market Ideology questionnaire (Jost et al., 2003), 
to identify whether subjects in China hold different notions of what constitutes fair behavior in 
markets. We construct an aggregate measure by averaging the responses to the 25 scale items, 
ranging from -5 to 5. Higher numbers reflect greater agreement with the view that market 
systems and the outcomes they produce are fair. The average response in China is significantly 
higher than the average response in Switzerland (respectively, mean (S.E) = 0.714 (0.011) vs. -
0.102 (0.016), t614 = 8.70, p < 0.001). Hence, we find a greater general perception among 
respondents in China that the outcomes produced by free markets are fair.25  
Our primary interest is in whether we observe differences in market behavior. The solid 
lines in Figure III present the fair product market shares in the Market conditions in Switzerland 
(no markers) and China (markers).26 The frequency of fair products traded in Switzerland, 48.3 
percent across the entire experiment, is very similar to that in the Market Baseline from Study 1 
(44.3 percent), which provides a direct replication of Result 1, using a new sample of subjects, 
including different study majors. However, the frequency of fair product purchases in China is 
much lower: 16.3 percent across the experiment. Hence, despite studying identical market 
environments, we observe significantly less socially responsible behavior in China than in 
Switzerland. In fact, the frequency of socially responsible market outcomes in China is lower 
than in any condition from Study 1 (see Figure I), including the one in which the cost of 
mitigating the externality was four times as high.27 
[Insert Figure III about here] 
                                                            
25 For example, for the statement, “In free market systems, people tend to get the outcomes that they deserve” 
(completely disagree: -5, completely agree: +5), respondents tend to agree significantly more in China than in 
Switzerland (1.987 vs. -1.075, t614 = 13.67, p < 0.001). For the statement, “When a company raises the prices that it 
charges its customers for its goods, because management has obtained market research which suggests that its 
customers are willing to pay more, it is ...” (completely unfair: -5, completely fair: +5), respondents in China judged 
the behavior as more fair (1.292 vs. 0.633, t614 = 3.15, p < 0.01). 
26 As with Study 1, we omit cases in which no product was traded (3 percent in Switzerland, 2 percent in China). 
27 We also observe differences in the price dynamics between Switzerland and China. Average prices in Market 
Switzerland sessions are similar to those in Study 1, with average prices for the fair product of 30.1 and for the 
unfair product of 24.7, and a general decreasing trend over the course of the experiment. In China, we observe a 
smaller price premium (26.1 vs. 24.9) that decreases over the course of the experiment; in the final third of the 
experiment there is no difference in price for the two types of products. 
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 Models 1 and 2 in Table VII report random-effects probit regressions of fair product 
purchases across experimental locations and time. Consistent with Figure III, the likelihood of a 
fair product exchange is significantly lower in China than in Switzerland, and this difference is 
stable over time.28 We also used the data to estimate the utility models from Section V.A, 
separately, for consumers in Switzerland and China (see Online Appendix, Table E.1). Recall 
that the ratio between the weights placed on own payoffs (ߠ) and those of the third party (ߛ) 
measures the relative concern by consumers, on average, for these two impacts of a choice. For 
Switzerland, the estimated ratio is 13, which is close to the estimate of 11 from the Market 
Baseline from Study 1. However, for China it is almost twice as high (25).  
Nevertheless, even though the manifestation of social responsibility is weaker in China 
than in Switzerland, we observe a persistent market share for the socially responsible product 
even in the market in China. As Figure III and Table VII show, this proportion is stable over 
time. Hence, despite it being weaker than in Switzerland, we find evidence of stable market 
social responsibility in China.29  
[Insert Table VII about here] 
The No Market conditions using the swapped choice sets common to both Switzerland 
and China allow us to directly compare the degrees of social concern in non-market settings in 
the two countries. This is important for interpreting the difference between the two Market 
conditions in Figure III. On the one hand, this difference might simply reflect a general 
difference in the propensity to consider the welfare of others, in which case we would expect 
subjects in China to also exhibit less social concern in a non-market context than subjects in 
Switzerland. However, this is inconsistent with earlier laboratory evidence showing Chinese not 
to be systematically less pro-social in non-market laboratory decisions (Buchan et al. 2006; 
Chuah et al. 2007; Bohnet et al. 2008). Alternatively, it is possible that the difference in behavior 
arises because of differences in norms specifically governing behavior in markets, with Chinese 
individuals exhibiting a greater tolerance for unfair or unethical behavior in markets than 
                                                            
28 As in Study 1, consumers in both countries respond sensibly to prices, purchasing fair products more often as the 
relative price of fair products decreases. We also tested whether differences in the tendency for consumers to 
purchase socially responsible products related to individual variation in responses to the Free Market Ideology scale 
but find no robust relationship between questionnaire responses and behavior in the market.  
29 This is also reflected in the estimated consumer utility weights, which reveal a significant positive concern for 
both own payoff and the welfare of the third party in China, as well as in Switzerland (Online Appendix, Table E.1). 
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respondents in Switzerland, as reflected in responses to the Fair Market ideology scale and in 
prior research. 
Figure III presents data from the No Market condition in both countries. To allow 
comparability between No Market data from Switzerland and China, we use only the matched 
choice sets that were included in the “swapped” versions of the No Market conditions. Hence, 
the No Market lines in Figure III are based on the same 40 choice sets, each faced by one subject 
in Switzerland and one in China. In the non-market context, we find very little difference in 
behavior between Switzerland and China. Across the entire experiment, both subjects in 
Switzerland and in China select choices that do not harm the third party 56.7 percent of the 
time.30 Models 3 and 4 in Table VII report the results of random-effects probit regressions that 
test for differences in non-market behavior between Switzerland and China—again, using only 
the directly comparable matched choice sets included in the “swap.” There is no statistically 
significant difference, in either levels of exhibited social concern or in time trends.31  
RESULT 7: Outcomes in both the Market Switzerland and Market China conditions reveal 
stable concern for the welfare of the third party. The market share of the fair product 
is significantly lower in the subject pool in China than in Switzerland. Social concern 
in the No Market context is very similar between China and Switzerland. 
VII. MARKET VS. NON-MARKET SOCIAL CONCERN 
Both studies include No Market conditions that allow direct comparisons between 
choices made in a non-market context and the behavior of individual consumers in the Market 
Baseline. Recall, from the experimental design of Study 1 in Section III, that we created the No 
Market condition by taking the 24 product choice sets facing each consumer in the Market 
Baseline condition, and presenting these exact 24 choices—with identical monetary 
consequences for a set of three subjects—to another decision maker in the No Market condition. 
We did the same for the two market conditions in Study 2, Market Switzerland and Market 
                                                            
30 If we include the default choice that gives 100 to each subject, and count this as a fair choice, the proportions rise 
to 62.4 percent in Switzerland and 60.4 percent in China. These frequencies do not differ significantly. 
31 Table E.1 in the Online Appendix reports estimated utility weights from the swapped No Market choice data for 
both countries. We find very similar degrees of concern for the third party in Switzerland and China, with both 
models yielding ratios of approximately 6 between concern for own payoff (θ) and concern for the third party (γ). 
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China. Hence, we have three data sets, two in Switzerland and one in China, with which to make 
market vs. non-market comparisons of the degree of concern for social impact. 
Figure IV presents the frequencies of fair product purchases and fair non-market choices 
across all three data sets, as well as the pooled data from Switzerland for Studies 1 and 2. The 
solid lines indicate fair product purchases in the market conditions and are comparable to the 
corresponding lines in Figures I and III, except that here we include not purchasing a product in 
the market and the default egalitarian choice in the non-market conditions—which yield payoffs 
of 100 for all three participants—as “fair.”32 In every comparison, the Market and No Market 
lines reflect choices from identical choice sets. The top two panels show a similar finding in the 
two studies in Switzerland: in both cases, the proportion of fair behavior is higher in the No 
Market condition than in the Market condition, with differences of 10 percentage points in Study 
1 and 18 percentage points in Study 2. The bottom-left panel, which pools the data from both 
studies in Switzerland, shows an aggregate difference of 14 percentage points. These differences 
are fairly stable across periods. We observe a similar pattern in China, shown in the bottom-right 
panel. Here, the difference is larger (25 percentage points), which is consistent with our 
observation in Section VI that there is a greater difference between market and non-market social 
concern in China than in Switzerland.33  
[Insert Figure IV about here] 
Table VIII presents the results of random-effects probit regressions of whether a subject 
made a fair choice. The results support the observations from Figure IV. The first two models 
compare the Market Baseline and No Market from Study 1, the next two do so for Market 
Switzerland and No Market Switzerland from Study 2, while models 5 and 6 pool the data from 
both studies in Switzerland. Across models 1-6, the constant term is not significantly different 
                                                            
32 In the No Market conditions, this is a natural interpretation of the egalitarian default choice. Recall that not 
purchasing a product is rare (1 percent) in the Market Baseline in Study 1, which is also true in Study 2 (3 percent in 
Market Switzerland and 2 percent in Market China). The corresponding default choice is more frequent in the No 
Market conditions: 3 percent in Study 1, 8 percent in Switzerland (Study 2) and 11 percent in China. 
33 The difference for China is somewhat constrained by the fact that many choice sets (54 percent) faced by 
consumers and decision makers in China contain no fair product alternative, other than the default; this is much less 
frequent in the choice sets in Switzerland (Study 1: 26 percent, Study 2: 24 percent), and is a consequence of firms 
offering fewer fair products in China. If we compare only cases in which a consumer saw at least one fair product 
and one unfair product (see Online Appendix Figure E.1), the differences between market and non-market fair 
behavior do not change much for Switzerland (e.g., the aggregate difference with the pooled data is 15 percentage 
points, close to the 14 percentage points difference in Figure IV), but the difference is considerably larger for China 
(35 percentage points). 
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from zero, indicating that the frequency of fair choices in markets in Switzerland was close to 50 
percent. The coefficients for No Market are always positive, but only statistically significant in 
some specifications, indicating that, while we consistently observe more fair behavior in the non-
market context, the statistical strength of this result is inconsistent. Nevertheless, in the combined 
sample from Switzerland, we find a statistically significant tendency to act more fairly in the 
non-market context than in the market. 
[Insert Table VIII about here] 
Models 7 and 8 present a comparison of Market China and No Market China. We observe 
some differences with models 1-6. First, the coefficient for the constant term is negative and 
statistically significant, indicating a strong tendency toward the unfair product in the market. 
Also, the coefficient for the No Market variable is larger for China than for the comparisons 
from Switzerland. Hence, as we observed in Section VI, the impact of market versus non-market 
contexts appears somewhat stronger in China than in Switzerland.34 
The final two models identify the overall effect of the non-market context, across all the 
data. We include variables to capture the fact that market behavior in China looks very different 
from market behavior in Switzerland—this is reflected in the negative and significant 
coefficients for the China variable. Starting, from these separate levels of market behavior, the 
coefficient for No Market identifies the effect on socially responsible behavior of the non-market 
context, on aggregate, across all comparisons.35 The positive and highly statistically significant 
coefficients indicate a strong effect of market context on the expression of social concern. 
                                                            
34 In Online Appendix Table E.2 we again estimate the utility model from Section V.A, allowing concern for the 
third party to vary between market and non-market contexts. Consistent with Table VIII, this interaction is small and 
statistically insignificant for the comparison in Switzerland from Study 1, but larger in both size and statistical 
significance for the Swiss data in Study 2 (p < 0.05) and for the combined Swiss data (p < 0.01). For the combined 
comparison for Switzerland, the non-market context increases the relative weight placed on the third party’s payoff 
by 70 percent (the ratio of importance of own payoff (ߠ) relative to that of the third party (ߛ) declines from 13 to 7). 
For China, the differences are much larger in both magnitude and statistical significance—e.g., the weight placed on 
the third party increases by 223 percent (the ratio of own concern versus that for the third party is 28 in the market 
and 9 in the non-market context). 
35 We do not include the fully interacted model (i.e., with China X No Market interactions) because our goal is to 
estimate the overall effect of the non-market context, relative to market behavior, jointly across all datasets. The 
interacted model would, instead, provide independent estimates of the market effect in different populations, which 
is already visible from the separate models. Moreover, statistical inference of the relative size of the market vs. non-
market differences between Switzerland and China using such an interacted model would be problematic, given the 
differences in choice sets between countries in the No Market data. Instead, we provide a more appropriate basis for 
this statistical comparison in Online Appendix Table E.2, where we rely on parameter estimates from our utility 
model, as in Table V. As this analysis reveals, the difference in concern for social impact between the market and 
non-market context is statistically significantly larger in China than in Switzerland. 
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RESULT 8: Socially responsible behavior is more prevalent in the No Market condition than 
in the corresponding Market condition across all comparisons. The differences are 
somewhat stronger in China than in Switzerland. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
This paper studies whether concerns for social responsibility persist in repeated market 
interaction. We develop a laboratory product market, in which socially responsible behavior by 
firms and consumers involves incurring additional production costs to mitigate negative 
externalities imposed on individuals otherwise uninvolved with the market.  
The data from Study 1, conducted in Switzerland, show, first, that there is a non-trivial 
share of socially responsible products supplied and demanded in all market conditions, and 
that—importantly—the market share is stable over time. Second, the socially responsible 
product, which costs more to produce, sells at a price premium that persists with market 
experience. In most cases, this price premium increases over time, suggesting that consumers’ 
willingness to pay for socially responsible products is not eliminated with repeated market 
interaction. Third, we show that individual-level market behavior is consistent with a preference 
for positive social impact, though such concerns are heterogeneous.  
We also document the robustness of social responsibility in markets to varying market 
conditions, such as increased seller competition and limited consumer information.36 But, we 
identify one feature of markets for socially responsible products—the technology costs of 
production—that strongly affects market share. This suggests a critical role for production 
subsidies as a mechanism for facilitating the adoption of socially responsible products in markets 
and improving market efficiency. Importantly, the pronounced reaction of market behavior to 
higher production costs occurs without substantive changes in the estimated underlying 
preferences of market participants, suggesting that subjects’ preferences for positive social 
impact are an important mechanism driving behavior in all market conditions.37  
                                                            
36  Further evidence that socially responsible market behavior is robust to alternative market characteristics is 
provided by Danz et al. (2012), who show experimentally that consumers with monopsony power in a duopoly 
market setting are willing to pay more for products produced by firms that pay higher wages to their workers. Their 
focus is on how such consumer concern is affected by variation in minimum wage policies. 
37 Moreover, the robustness of social responsibility in markets to a default state of limited information—which 
strongly decreases social concern in non-market settings (Dana, et al., 2007)—suggests that, in some ways, market 
social responsibility may be robust to factors that negatively impact non-market pro-social behavior. One possible 
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A critical feature of our markets is that we provide a technology that can mitigate the 
externality, at a cost to market participants. In this sense, our design allows social responsibility 
to be consistent with market exchange, rather than entirely orthogonal.38 The prevalence of such 
technologies is widespread in many existing markets. For example, “green,” “ethical sourcing” 
and “cruelty-free” are essentially production methods that typically involve higher costs that 
must be borne in some combination by firms and consumers. Hence, it is natural to study social 
responsibility in the presence of such technologies, and to understand their role in facilitating 
socially responsible market behavior. Indeed, our experiment provides clear evidence of the 
importance of such technologies, and of their costs, for social responsibility in markets.  
Study 2, comparing behavior between subject pools in Switzerland and China, finds that 
socially responsible market behavior is not solely driven by market characteristics or technology, 
but also varies across populations. Our data show that the frequency of fair product purchases in 
China is significantly lower—roughly, a third of the level observed in Switzerland—despite the 
structure of the experimental markets being identical and despite the fact that subjects in 
Switzerland and China do not differ in their behavior in our non-market context. Indeed, the 
market share of the fair product in China is lower than in any condition from Study 1. This 
suggests that cultural differences may play as important a role for the efficiency of market 
outcomes as other key economic factors (North 1981; Tabellini 2008), though more work is 
necessary to test the extent to which our findings with student samples extend to broader 
populations.  
Finally, in both studies, we also employ a novel design that allows us to conduct a direct 
comparison between the behavior of individuals in market and non-market contexts, holding 
constant most other important factors about the choices they face. Our non-market condition is a 
variant of the much-studied dictator game and thus provides a useful benchmark to which we can 
compare the level of pro-social behavior in our laboratory markets. Across three data sets, we 
observe a consistent pattern of diminished social concern in the market context. Hence, market 
behavior does seem to reflect less concern for social impact than comparable individual choice 
settings, even in choices that are consequentially and procedurally identical (cf. Falk and Szech, 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
interpretation of this difference is that the market context (in comparison with non-market individual choice 
contexts) already provides individuals willing to exploit justifications for acting self-interestedly the ability to do so. 
38 For related evidence that the feasibility of pro-social outcomes matters for their realization, in the context of 
principal-agent relationships, see Charness and Dufwenberg (2011). 
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2013). Moreover, the smaller differences we observe in Switzerland, relative to China, highlight 
that socially responsible behavior may be more robust to market contexts in some populations 
than in others.  
Hence, viewing all our results together, we provide a mixed response to the titular 
question of our article—do markets erode social responsibility? On the one hand, we find 
positive levels of socially responsible behavior in all our market conditions, both in Switzerland 
and in China—though the level of socially responsible behavior is much lower in China than in 
Switzerland. Moreover, irrespective of the different levels of socially responsible behavior we 
observe in different market settings, in no condition does this level persistently erode over time 
with repeated market interaction. On the other hand, our comparison of behavior in market and 
non-market contexts reveals that our subjects behave less socially responsibly in market setting. 
Hence, market interaction does lower social concern.   
Broadly, our results draw attention to the important challenge of understanding better the 
organizational, technological, and cultural conditions under which markets affect pro-social 
behavior. To this end, an appealing feature of our design is that it easily lends itself to further 
study. Thus, one of our contributions is what we believe to be a valuable and easily modified 
experimental paradigm for studying the factors that determine social responsibility in markets.  
 
UNIVERSITY OF ZURICH  
UNIVERSITY OF ZURICH 
SHANGHAI UNIVERSITY OF FINANCE AND ECONOMICS 
 
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL 
An Online Appendix for this article can be found at QJE online (qje.oxfordjournals.org). 
 
REFERENCES 
Ahmed, Mohamed M., Kun Young Chung, and John W. Eichenseher, “Business Students’ 
Perception of Ethics and Moral Judgment: A Cross-Cultural Study,” Journal of Business 
Ethics, 43 (2003), 89-102. 
 
 
33
Andreoni, James, and John Miller, “Giving According to GARP: An Experimental Test of the 
Consistency of Preferences for Altruism,” Econometrica, 70 (2002), 737-753. 
Arrow, Kenneth, “Political and Economic Evaluation of Social Effects and Externalities,” in The 
Analysis of Public Output, Julius Margolis, ed. (National Bureau of Economic Research 
Distributed by Columbia University Press, 1970). 
Bénabou, Roland, and Jean Tirole, “Individual and Corporate Social Responsibility,” 
Economica, 77 (2010), 1-19. 
Besley, Timothy, “What’s the Good of the Market? An Essay on Michael Sandel’s ‘What Money 
Can’t Buy,” Journal of Economic Literature, 51 (2013), 478-495. 
Bohnet, Iris, Fiona Greig, Benedikt Herrmann, and Richard Zeckhauser, “Betrayal Aversion: 
Evidence from Brazil, China, Oman, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United States,” American 
Economic Review, 98 (2008), 294-310. 
Bowles, Samuel, “Endogenous Preferences: The cultural consequences of markets and other 
economic institutions,” Journal of Economic Literature, 36 (1998), 75-111. 
Brandts, Jordi, Arno Riedl, and Franz van Winden, “Competitive Rivalry, Social Disposition, 
and Subjective Well-being: An Experiment,” Journal of Public Economics, 93 (2009), 
1158-1167. 
Breyer, Friedrich, and Joachim Weimann, “Of Morals, Markets and Mice: A Comment on Falk 
and Szech,” CESifo Working Paper No. 4745, 2014. 
Buchan, Nancy R., Eric J. Johnson, and Rachel T. A. Croson, “Let’s Get Personal: An 
International Examination of the Influence of Communication, Culture and Social Distance 
on Other Regarding Preferences,” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 60 
(2006), 373-398. 
Cai, Hongbin, and Qiao Liu, “Competition and Corporate Tax Avoidance: Evidence for Chinese 
Industrial Firms,” Economic Journal, 119 (2009), 764-795. 
Camerer, Colin F, Behavioral Game Theory, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003).  
Cappelen, Alexander W., Astri D. Hole, Erik Ø. Sørensen, and Bertil Tungodden, “The 
Pluralism of Fairness Ideals: An Experimental Approach,” American Economic Review, 97 
(2007), 818-827. 
Cappelen, Alexander W., Erik Ø. Sørensen, and Bertil Tungodden, “When Do We Lie?” Journal 
of Economic Behavior & Organization, 93 (2013), 258-265. 
Charness, Gary, and Martin Dufwenberg, “Participation,” American Economic Review, 101 
(2011), 1211-1237. 
 
 
34
Chuah, Swee-Hoon, Robert Hoffmann, Martin Jones, and Geoffrey Williams, “Do Cultures 
Clash? Evidence from Cross-national Ultimatum Game Experiments,” Journal of Economic 
Behavior & Organization, 64 (2007), 35-48. 
Dana, Jason, Roberto A. Weber, and Jason Xi Kuang, “Exploiting Moral Wiggle Room: 
Experiments Demonstrating an Illusory Preference for Fairness,” Economic Theory, 33 
(2007), 67–80. 
Danz, David, Dirk Engelmann, and Dorothea Kübler, “Do Legal Standards Affect Ethical 
Concerns of Consumers? An Experiment on Minimum Wages,” University of Mannheim, 
Department of Economics, Working Paper 12-3, 2012. 
Darley, John, and Bibb Latane, “Bystander Intervention in Emergencies: Diffusion of 
Responsibility,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 8 (1968), 377-383. 
De Pelsmacker, Patrick, Liesbeth Driesen, and Glenn Rayp, “Do Consumers Care about Ethics? 
Willingness to Pay for Fair Trade Coffee,” Journal of Consumer Affairs, 39 (2005), 363-
385. 
Dufwenberg, Martin, Paul Heidhues, Georg Kirchsteiger, Frank Riedel, and Joel Sobel, “Other-
Regarding Preferences in General Equilibrium,” Review of Economic Studies, 78 (2011), 
640-66. 
Engel, Christoph, “Dictator Games: A Meta Study,” Experimental Economics, 14 (2011), 583-
610. 
Falk, Armin, and Nora Szech, “Morals and Markets,” Science, 340 (2013), 707-711. 
Fehr, Ernst, and Armin Falk, “Wage Rigidity in a Competitive Incomplete Contract Market,” 
Journal of Political Economy, 107 (1999), 106-34. 
Fehr, Ernst, Georg Kirchsteiger, and Arno Riedl, “Does Fairness Prevent Market Clearing? An 
Experimental Investigation,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108 (1993), 437-59. 
Fehr, Ernst, and Klaus M. Schmidt, “A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation,” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114 (1999), 817-868. 
Fischbacher, Urs, “Z-Tree: Zurich Toolbox for Ready-made Economic Experiments,” 
Experimental Economics, 10 (2007), 171–78.  
Fisman, Raymond, Shachar Kariv, and Daniel Markovits, “Individual Preferences for Giving,” 
American Economic Review, 97 (2007), 1858-1876. 
Francoisi, Robert, Praveen Kujal, Roland Michelitsch, Vernon Smith, and Gang Deng, “Fairness: 
Effect on Temporary and Equilibrium Prices in Posted-Offer Markets,” Economic Journal, 
105 (1995), 938-950. 
 
 
35
Frey, Bruno S., Felix Oberholzer-Gee, and Reiner Eichenberger, “The Old Lady Visits Your 
Backyard: A Tale of Morals and Markets,” Journal of Political Economy, 104 (1996), 1297-
1313. 
Gao, Yue, “A study of fairness judgments in China, Switzerland and Canada: Do culture, being a 
student, and gender matter?” Judgment and Decision Making, 4 (2009), 214-226. 
Gneezy, Uri, and Aldo Rustichini, “A Fine Is a Price,” The Journal of Legal Studies, 29 (2000), 
1-17. 
Hamman, John, George Loewenstein, and Roberto A .Weber, “Self-Interest through Delegation: 
An Additional Rationale for the Principal-Agent Relationship,” American Economic 
Review, 100 (2010), 1826–46.  
Henrich, Joseph, Robert Boyd, Samuel Bowles, Colin Camerer, Ernst Fehr, Herbert Gintis and 
Richard McElreath, “In Search of Homo Economicus: Behavioral Experiments in 15 Small-
Scale Societies,” American Economic Review, 91 (2001), 73-78.  
Henrich, Joseph, Jean Ensminger, Richard McElreath, Abigail Barr, Clark Barrett, Alexander 
Bolyanatz, Juan Camilo Cardenas, Michael Gurven, Edwins Gwako, Natalie Henrich, 
Carolyn Lesorogol, Frank Marlowe, David Tracer, John Ziker, “Markets, Religion, 
Community Size, and the Evolution of Fairness and Punishment,” Science, 327 (2010), 
1480-1484. 
Herrmann, Benedikt, Christian Thöni, and Simon Gächter, “Antisocial Punishment across 
Societies,” Science, 319 (2008), 1362-1367. 
Hoffman, Elizabeth, Kevin McCabe, Keith Shachat, and Vernon Smith, “Preferences, Property 
Rights, and Anonymity in Bargaining Games,” Games and Economic Behavior, 7 (1994), 
346-380. 
Holt, Charles, “Industrial Organization: A Survey of Laboratory Research,” in The Handbook of 
Experimental Economics, John H. Kagel, and Alvin E. Roth ed. (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1995). 
Ip, Po Keung, “The Challenge of Developing a Business Ethics in China,” Journal of Business 
Ethics, 88 (2009), 211-224. 
Johnston, Robert J., Cathy R. Wessells, Holger Donath, and Frank Asche, “Measuring Consumer 
Preferences for Ecolabeled Seafood: An International Comparison,” Journal of Agricultural 
& Resource Economics, 26 (2001), 20-39. 
Jost, John T., Sally Blount, Jeffrey Pfeffer, and György Hunyady, “Fair Market Ideology: Its 
Cognitive-Motivational Underpinnings,” Research in Organizational Behavior, 25 (2003) 
53-91. 
 
 
36
Kachelmeier, Steven J., and Mohamed Shehata, “Culture and competition,” Journal of Economic 
Behavior & Organization, 19 (1992), 145-168. 
Kachelmeier, Steven J., Stephen T. Limberg, and Michael S. Schadewald, “A Laboratory Market 
Examination of the Consumer Price Response to Information about Producers’ Costs and 
Profits,” Accounting Review, 66 (1991), 694-717. 
Kahneman, Daniel, Jack L. Knetsch, and Richard H. Thaler, “Fairness as a Constraint on Profit 
Seeking: Entitlements in the Market,” American Economic Review, 76 (1986), 728–741. 
Kube, Sebastian, Michel A. Maréchal, and Clemens Puppe, “The Currency of Reciprocity: Gift 
Exchange in the Workplace,” American Economic Review, 102 (2012), 1644-62. 
Lee, Nick, Amanda Beatson, Tony C. Garrett, Ian Lings, and Xi Zhang, “A Study of the 
Attitudes Towards Unethical Selling Amongst Chinese Salespeople,” Journal of Business 
Ethics, 88 (2009), 497-515. 
Loureiro, Maria L., Jill J. McCluskey, and Ron C. Mittelhammer, “Assessing Consumer 
Preferences for Organic, Eco-labeled, and Regular Apples,” Journal of Agricultural & 
Resource Economics, 26 (2001), 404-416. 
McFadden, Daniel, “Conditional Logit Analysis of Qualitative Choice Behavior,” in Frontiers in 
Econometrics, Paul Zarembka, ed. (New York: Academic Press, 1974). 
Mellström, Carl, and Magnus Johannesson, “Crowding Out in Blood Donations: Was Titmuss 
Right?” Journal of the European Economic Association, 6 (2008), 845-863. 
North, Douglas C., Structure and Change in Economic History, (New York: Norton, 1981). 
Plott, Charles R., “Externalities and Corrective Policies in Experimental Markets,” Economic 
Journal, 93 (1983), 106-127. 
Plott, Charles R., and Vernon L. Smith, “An Experimental Examination of Two Exchange 
Institutions,” Review of Economic Studies, 45 (1978), 133-153. 
Politi, Daniel, “Apple CEO to Global Warming Deniers: We Don’t Want Your Money,” Slate, 
(http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_slatest/2014/03/01/apple_ceo_tim_cook_shoots_down_glo
bal_warming_deniers_at_shareholders_meeting.html), 2014. 
Roe, Brian, Mario F. Teisl, Alan Levy, and Matthew Russell, “US consumers’ willingness to pay 
for green electricity,” Energy Policy, 29 (2001), 917-925. 
Ross, Lee, and Andrew Ward, “Naïve Realism in Everyday Life: Implications of Social Conflict 
and Misunderstanding,” in Values and Knowledge, Edward S. Reed, Elliot Turiel, and 
Terrance Brown, Ed. (Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 1996). 
Roth, Alvin E., Vesna Prasnikar, Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara, and Shmuel Zamir, “Bargaining 
and Market Behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh and Tokyo: An Experimental 
Study,” American Economic Review, 81 (1991), 1068-1095. 
 
 
37
Sandel, Michael, What Money Can’t Buy, 1st Ed. (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2012).  
Shleifer, Andrei, “Does Competition Destroy Ethical Behavior?” American Economic Review 
Papers and Proceedings, 94 (2004), 414-418. 
Smith, Vernon L., “An Experimental Study of Competitive Market Behavior,” Journal of 
Political Economy, 70 (1962), 111-137. 
Smith, Vernon L., and Arlington W. Williams, “The Effects of Rent Asymmetries in 
Experimental Auction Markets,” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 3 (1982), 
99-116. 
Sobel, Joel, “Do Markets Make People Look Selfish?” Mimeo, University of California, San 
Diego, 2010. 
Tabellini, Guido, “Institutions and Culture,” Journal of the European Economic Association, 6 
(2008), 255-294. 
Vohs, Kathleen D., Nicole L. Meade, and Miranda R. Goode, “The Psychological Consequences 
of Money,” Science, 314 (2006), 1156. 
Wong, Alan, Fu Long, and S. Elankumaran, “Business Students’ Perception of Corporate Social 
Responsibility: The United States, China, and India,” Corporate Social Responsibility and 
Environmental Management, 17 (2010), 299-310. 
   
 
 
38
TABLE I 
SESSION OVERVIEW AND NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS 
Treatment Markets 
Firms 
(Participant A) 
Consumers 
(Participant B) 
Third Parties 
(Participant C) 
Market Baseline 7 42 35 35 
High Firm Competition 6 48 30 30 
Limited Information (Free) 6 36 30 30 
Limited Information (Costly) 6 36 30 30 
High Production Cost 6 36 30 30 
No Market - 35 35 35 
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TABLE II 
RANDOM-EFFECTS PROBIT REGRESSIONS OF FAIR CONSUMER PRODUCT CHOICE IN MARKET 
BASELINE  
 All periods Consumer saw both types of products 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Period -0.007 (0.008) 
-0.007 
(0.008) 
-0.013 
(0.010) 
0.014 
(0.022) 
Number of Product Offers  0.054 (0.047)   
Lowest price of fair product    -0.403
*** 
(0.074) 
Lowest price of unfair product    0.385
*** 
(0.063) 
Constant  -0.009 (0.211) 
-0.225 
(0.252) 
0.180 
(0.248) 
2.275 
(1.826) 
Observations 831 831 621 621 
Number of subjects 35 35 35 35 
Notes. The dependent variable in all models takes on value 1 if a consumer purchased a fair 
product and 0 otherwise. The table reports raw probit coefficients. All four models omit the nine cases in 
which a consumer made no product purchase. Models (1) and (2) include all purchasing decisions. Models 
(3) and (4) further exclude cases in which either only fair or unfair products were available to a consumer. 
Period takes on integer values between 1 and 24. Number of Product Offers takes on integer values 
between 2 and 6 and controls for the size of a consumer’s choice set. Lowest price of (un)fair product is 
the lowest price among all (un)fair products in a consumer’s choice set. The models allow for individual 
level random effects. Robust standard errors (clustered by subject) in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1. 
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TABLE III 
RANDOM-EFFECTS REGRESSIONS OF PRICES BY PRODUCT TYPE 
Market 
Baseline 
High Firm 
Competition 
Limited Info. 
(Free) 
Limited Info. 
(Costly) 
High Prod. 
Cost 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Period -0.283
*** 
(0.037) 
-0.474*** 
(0.066) 
-0.574*** 
(0.051) 
-0.342*** 
(0.055) 
-0.154*** 
(0.048) 
Fair Product 2.401
*** 
(0.651) 
3.328*** 
(0.846) 
3.121*** 
(1.153) 
1.202 
(0.934) 
8.993*** 
(1.448) 
Period X 
Fair Product 
0.108** 
(0.050) 
0.190** 
(0.079) 
0.192** 
(0.078) 
0.103* 
(0.062) 
0.115* 
(0.066) 
Constant 26.881
*** 
(0.574) 
21.812*** 
(0.754) 
28.771*** 
(0.791) 
30.240*** 
(0.989) 
31.974*** 
(0.836) 
Observations 831 711 695 702 686 
Num. of subjs. 35 30 30 30 30 
Notes. The dependent variable in all models is the price of a purchased product. Period takes on integer 
values between 1 and 24. Fair Product is a binary variable taking on value 1 in case of a fair product and value 0 in 
case of an unfair product. The models allow for individual level random effects. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses (clustered by subject), *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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TABLE IV 
RANDOM-EFFECTS PROBIT REGRESSIONS OF FAIR CONSUMER PRODUCT CHOICE IN MARKET 
BASELINE AND ALTERNATIVE MARKET CONDITIONS 
 
Baseline vs.  
High Firm 
Competition  
Baseline vs. 
Limited Info.  
(Free) 
Baseline vs. 
Limited Info.  
(Costly) 
Baseline vs. 
High Production 
Cost 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Treatment 0.373 (0.359) 
0.494 
(0.333) 
-0.314 
(0.374) 
-0.472 
(0.378) 
-0.136 
(0.307) 
0.167 
(0.308) 
-0-896** 
(0.387) 
-0867** 
(0.401) 
Period  
-0.007 
(0.008)  
-0.007 
(0.008)  
-0.007 
(0.008)  
-0.007 
(0.008) 
Period X 
Treatment  
-0.010 
(0.013)  
0.013 
(0.016)  
-0.025 
(0.017)  
-0.002 
(0.017) 
Constant -0.085 (0.230) 
-0.001 
(0.209) 
-0.083 
(0.232) 
0.002 
(0.211) 
-0.098 
(0.225) 
-0.014 
(0.204) 
-0.079 
(0.234) 
0.005 
(0.213) 
Observations 1,542 1,542 1,526 1,526 1,533 1,533 1,517 1,517 
Num. of subjs. 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 
Notes. The dependent variable in all models takes on value 1 if a consumer purchased a fair product and 0 
otherwise. The table reports raw probit coefficients. Each model contains the purchasing decision from the Market 
Baseline and one additional treatment, as indicated in the column heading. The omitted category is Market Baseline 
and Treatment is a binary variable taking on value 1 if an observation comes from the respective additional treatment 
and 0 otherwise. Period takes on integer values between 1 and 24. We omit cases in which consumers made no 
product purchase. The models allow for individual level random effects. Robust standard errors (clustered by 
subject) in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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TABLE V 
ESTIMATED WEIGHTS FOR CONSUMER UTILITY MODEL 
 
Baseline 
Market 
Baseline & 
High Firm 
Competition
Baseline & 
Lim. Info. 
(Free) 
Baseline & 
Lim. Info. 
(Costly) 
Baseline & 
High Cost 
All Market 
Conditions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Consumer 
Earnings (ߠ) 
0.372*** 
(0.062) 
0.370*** 
(0.054) 
0.395*** 
(0.044) 
0.439*** 
(0.054) 
0.214*** 
(0.069) 
0.282*** 
(0.041) 
Third Party 
Earnings (ߛ) 
0.033*** 
(0.006) 
0.032*** 
(0.007) 
0.034*** 
(0.006) 
0.038*** 
(0.006) 
0.020*** 
(0.008) 
0.025*** 
(0.006) 
Third Party (ߛ) X 
H.F. Competition  
0.008 
(0.009)    
0.005 
(0.008) 
Third Party (ߛ) X 
Lim. Info. (Free)   
0.000 
(0.009)   
0.001 
(0.008) 
Third Party (ߛ) X  
Lim. Info. 
(Costly) 
   -0.018
** 
(0.009)  
-0.012 
(0.008) 
Third Party (ߛ) X  
High Prod. Cost     
0.006 
(0.009) 
0.006 
(0.011) 
Observations 4,205 9,247 7,835 7,821 7,848 20,136 
Cases 840 1560 1560 1560 1560 3,720 
Notes. The table reports coefficient estimates for utility functions as specified in Section V.A., using 
McFadden’s (1974) conditional logit choice model. ߠ denotes the weight consumers place on their own payoff and 
	ߛ denotes the weight consumers place on the third parties’ payoff. Model (1) contains all consumer decisions from 
the Market Baseline. Models (2) through (5) each additionally contain data from one additional treatment. In these 
models, the omitted category is Market Baseline and the respective treatment variable is binary and takes on value 
1 if an observation comes from the respective additional treatment and 0 otherwise. Model (6) contains the data 
from all market conditions. All models include period, gender and ln(age) as case-specific (intercept) terms
(coefficients omitted). Robust standard errors (clustered by subject) in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. 
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TABLE VI 
RANDOM-EFFECTS PROBIT REGRESSIONS OF FIRM PRODUCT DECISIONS 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
High Firm Competition 0.359 (0.415)   
0.337 
(0.388) 
Limited Information (Free) -0.413 (0.474)   
-0.346 
(0.448) 
Limited Information (Costly) -0.112 (0.459)   
-0.067 
(0.434) 
High Production Cost -1.323
** 
(0.554)   
-0.565 
(0.522) 
Firm Offered Fair Product Last Period  
0.298** 
(0.119)  
0.357*** 
(0.126) 
Expected Fair Product Profit Premium   
0.028*** 
(0.004) 
0.030*** 
(0.004) 
Constant -0.123 (0.324) 
-0.504*** 
(0.153) 
-0.209 
(0.164) 
-0.250 
(0.308) 
Observations 
Number of subjects 
4,752 
198 
4,554 
198 
4,396 
198 
4,396 
198 
Notes. The dependent variable in all models is a binary variable taking on value 1 if a firm offered a fair 
product and 0 otherwise. The table reports raw probit coefficients. Models (1) and (4) contain indicator variables for 
the additional market conditions; Market Baseline is the omitted category. Firm Offered Fair Product Last Period 
is a binary variable taking on value 1 if a firm offered the fair product in the preceding period. The variable 
Expected Fair Product Profit Premium measures the average realized profit difference between offering a fair 
product and offering an unfair product in the preceding period. Robust standard errors (clustered by subject) in 
parentheses. Models (2) through (4) exclude the first period; models (3) and (4) additionally exclude cases in which 
either a fair or unfair product was not offered in the prior period. The models allow for individual level random 
effects. Robust standard errors (clustered by subject) in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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TABLE VII 
RANDOM-EFFECTS PROBIT REGRESSIONS OF FAIR CHOICES IN SWITZERLAND AND CHINA 
 
Market China & Switzerland No Market China & Switzerland 
(using matched choice sets only) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
China -1.447
*** 
(0.297) 
-1.529*** 
(0.322) 
-0.033 
(0.291) 
0.145 
(0.286) 
Period  -0.010 (0.013)  
0.004 
(0.009) 
Period X China  0.006 (0.017)  
-0.015 
(0.013) 
Constant -0.002 (0.219) 
0.126 
(0.246) 
0.333 
(0.206) 
0.280 
(0.206) 
Observations 1872 1872 1711 1711 
Number of subjects 80 80 80 80 
Notes. The dependent variable in Models (1) and (2) takes on value 1 if a consumer purchased a fair 
product and 0 otherwise. The dependent variable in Models (3) and (4) takes on value 1 if a decision maker in a 
No Market condition made a fair allocation choice (that gives player C a payoff of 100) and 0 otherwise. The 
table reports raw probit coefficients. Models (1) and (2) include all purchases made in Market Switzerland and 
Market China. Models (3) and (4) include only the matched choice sets from the No Market conditions in both 
countries. China is a binary variable taking on value 1 if an observation comes from a session conducted in China 
and 0 otherwise. Period takes on integer values between 1 and 24. We omit cases in which a consumer made no 
product purchase and the respective choices in the No Market condition. The models allow for individual level 
random effects. Robust standard errors (clustered by subject) in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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TABLE VIII 
RANDOM-EFFECTS PROBIT REGRESSIONS OF FAIR MARKET AND NON-MARKET CHOICES 
 
Switzerland 
(Study 1) 
Switzerland 
(Study 2) 
Switzerland 
(Combined) 
China 
(Study 2) 
Pooled 
(All Data) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
No Market 0.345 (0.324) 
0.317 
(0.305) 
0.801** 
(0.314) 
0.584 
(0.358) 
0.586*** 
(0.226) 
0.457* 
(0.238) 
1.030*** 
(0.279) 
0.938*** 
(0.290) 
0.741*** 
(0.177) 
0.625*** 
(0.185) 
Period  -0.007 (0.008)  
-0.012 
(0.014) 
 
 
-0.010 
(0.008)  
-0.006 
(0.011)  
-0.010 
(0.007) 
Period X No Market  0.002 (0.012)  
0.018 
(0.017)  
0.011 
(0.011)  
0.008 
(0.015)  
0.010 
(0.009) 
China         -1.109
*** 
(0.186) 
-1.144*** 
(0.195) 
Period X China          0.003 (0.009) 
Constant  -0.081 (0.229) 
0.009 
(0.208) 
0.035 
(0.226) 
0.188 
(0.257) 
-0.019 
(0.161) 
0.105 
(0.168) 
-1.339*** 
(0.185) 
-1.269*** 
(0.195) 
-0.101 
(0.143) 
0.017 
(0.149) 
Observations 1680 1680 1920 1920 3600 3600 1920 1920 5520 5520 
Number of subjects 70 70 80 80 150 150 80 80 230 230 
Notes. The dependent variable in all models takes on value 1 if a consumer in a Market condition purchased a fair product or made no product 
purchase or if a decision maker in a No Market condition made a fair allocation choice (that gives player C a payoff of 100) and 0 otherwise. The table 
reports raw probit coefficients. Cases in which a consumer made no product purchase and the respective choices in the No Market condition are 
counted as fair. The Market condition is the omitted category in models (1) through (8). No Market is a binary variable taking on value 1 if an 
observation comes from the No Market condition and 0 otherwise. Period takes on integer values between 1 and 24. Market Switzerland is the omitted 
category in models (9) and (10) that pool the data from both countries. China is a binary variable taking on value 1 if an observation comes from a 
session conducted in China and 0 otherwise. The models allow for individual level random effects. Robust standard errors (clustered by subject) in 
parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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FIGURE I 
Fair Product Purchases across Varying Market Conditions 
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FIGURE II 
Price Premium for the Fair Product across Varying Market Conditions 
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FIGURE III 
Fair Product Purchases and Choices in China and Switzerland 
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FIGURE IV 
Fair Purchases / Choices in Market and No Market Conditions 
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A. SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY MODELED AS INEQUITY AVERSION 
In this appendix we provide an illustrative example of how a simple model of social 
preferences can be applied to our experimental markets. Specifically, we analyze firm and 
consumer decisions using the model of inequity aversion introduced by Fehr and Schmidt 
(1999). We selected this model because of its simplicity and widespread use in many other 
applications. 
We assume that some consumers and some firms are socially responsible, which we 
model as inequity aversion with regard to the third party. Since consumers and firms are both 
free to choose what to trade and at which price, we do not apply the concept of social 
responsibility to their mutual relationship. We thus maintain the assumption of the pure self-
interest model that consumers and firms do not care about each other’s payoffs. As we note in 
the paper, this model fairly accurately describes convergence to equilibrium predictions in 
markets that only involve payoff implications for buyers and sellers. 
We first derive the price premiums that (i) a consumer is willing to pay for the fair 
product on top of the price of the unfair product and that (ii) a firm demands for offering the fair 
product, which is more costly to produce. We show that for sufficiently high degrees of social 
responsibility (i.e., aversion to advantageous inequality with regard to the third party) trade of 
the fair product becomes feasible. We then derive the equilibrium predictions for prices and 
product shares in our baseline and high cost conditions, taking price competition among firms 
and social preference type heterogeneity into account.  


1 
A.1.   PRICE PREMIUM THAT A CONSUMER IS WILLING TO PAY FOR THE FAIR 
PRODUCT 
Consider a socially responsible consumer who experiences a disutility equal to   
times the positive difference between her own payoff and that of the third party, in addition to 
the utility produced by her own payoff. Denote the consumer’s and third party’s endowment, 
respectively, as  and , the value of the product as , the size of the externality as , and the 
prices of the fair and unfair product as  and , respectively. A consumer prefers buying 
the fair product over buying the unfair product if  
               
                      
With    and   , this simplifies to 
         (1) 
Hence, a socially responsible consumer buys the fair product instead of the unfair product if , 
the price premium for the fair product, does not exceed the r.h.s. of (1). The important 
observation is that a socially responsible consumer is willing to pay a higher price for the fair 
than for the unfair product even though the material value, , to the consumer is identical for 
both types of products. The increasing curve in Figure A.1 illustrates the price premium the 
consumer is willing to pay as a function of. The size of the externality in Figure A is set to 
   as in our experiment. 
A.2.   PRICE PREMIUM THAT A FIRM DEMANDS FOR OFFERING THE FAIR PRODUCT 
Consider next a socially responsible firm that experiences a “disutility” equal to   
times the positive difference between its own payoff and that of the third party, in addition to the 
utility from its own monetary payoff. A socially responsible firm requires the following price 
premium in order to be willing to sell the fair instead of the unfair product. 
               
                    
  


2 
With    and   , this simplifies to 
          (2) 
A socially responsible firm is thus willing to offer the fair product at a price premium that does 
not fully cover the higher cost, , of production. Put differently, in order to be willing to offer the 
unfair product, a socially responsible firm demands a markup of at least βe/(1-β) on top of the 
cost of production of the unfair product (normalized to zero in our setting) as a compensation for 
imposing the externality on the third party. The decreasing curves in Figure A.1, illustrate the 
required price premium for    (solid line) and    (dashed line), which correspond to 
the cost of production of the fair product type in the baseline and the high cost conditions, 
respectively. 
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FIGURE A.1 
Price Premium as Functions of the Inequity Aversion Parameter 
Notes. The figure shows the price premium  that a consumer is willing to pay for 
the fair product on top of the price of the unfair product (increasing line) and the price 
premium that a firm demands for offering the fair product instead of the unfair product 
(decreasing lines; solid for   , dashed for   ) as a function of . The externality is 
set to   .  
  
price premium 
that a consumer 
is willing to pay  
price premium 
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  
  


3 
A.3.   CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH TRADE OF THE FAIR PRODUCT IS FEASIBLE 
Assume, for simplicity, that both firm and consumer have the same degree  of concern 
about the third party. It then follows from equations (1) and (2) that if    , a 
consumer’s willingness to pay for the fair product is as least as high as a firm’s required price 
premium. In such cases, there will always be a price premium such that trading the fair product 
becomes feasible.1 However, the higher the relative cost of production of the fair product, the 
higher the necessary level of  such that trade of the fair product becomes feasible: with    
this level is   , and with    it is   , given   . If    , the price 
premium is , i.e., firm and consumer each bear exactly half of the higher cost of production 
of the fair product. This corresponds to the intersection of the curves shown in Figure A.1.  
If     , which is     with     and     with    , it is 
possible for either the firm or the consumer to bear the entire additional production cost, i.e. all 
price premiums between  and  are possible. In Figure A.1 this corresponds to the values of  
that are given by the intersection of the respective decreasing curve with the -axis (firm’s 
required price premium is zero) or where the increasing curve reaches the value of 10 or 40, 
respectively (consumers are willing to pay for the entire additional cost of producing the fair 
product). 
A.4.   THE MARKET EQUILIBRIUM WITH PURELY SELF-INTERESTED PREFERENCES 
Given that there are more firms than consumers in our experiment and that each firm and 
consumer can trade at most one product, the pure self-interest theory predicts that price 
competition among firms leads to prices equal to cost in equilibrium. That is, the price of the fair 
product will be    and the price of the unfair product will be   . Purely self-
interested consumers would, however, not buy the fair product at price    but always the 
unfair product at price   . Given that a firm’s monetary profit equals zero for both types 
of product, purely self-interested firms are indifferent between offering a fair or an unfair 
product, and they also do not care whether they can sell or not (recall that the cost of production 
 
1 In general, without assuming that consumer and firm have the same β, trade of the fair product becomes feasible if 
            where  and  denote the consumer’s and firm’s individual and potentially 
different concern for the third party.  


4 
is incurred only if a product offer is sold). The pure self-interest model thus predicts that only the 
unfair product is traded at price    in equilibrium. 
A.5.   HETEROGENEOUS INEQUITY-AVERSE PREFERENCES 
To study a prediction for the competitive market with socially responsible behavior and 
for preference type heterogeneity, we use the distribution of preference types suggested by Fehr 
and Schmidt (1999) in Table III (p. 844). According to this distribution, 30 percent of subjects 
(i.e., of consumers and of firms) are purely self-interested with   , 30 percent of subjects 
have   , and 40 percent have   .2 In the following, we derive the market equilibria 
predicted under such preferences, for    and   , respectively. Since we are interested in 
qualitative predictions, we ignore, for simplicity, the integer problem in our markets with 5 
consumers and 6 firms. 
A.5.1.   THE MARKET EQUILIBRIUM WITH     
The predictions of the Fehr-Schmidt model in our baseline condition with    and 
   are given as follows (for both the Market Baseline and the High Firm Competition 
conditions): 
• The market share of the fair product is 70 percent. 
• The fair product trades at    and the unfair product trades at   . 
In particular, the following actions form the market equilibrium: The 30 percent of firms with 
   each offer the unfair product at   , and the 30 percent of consumers with    
each accept an unfair product offer. The 70 percent of firms with    or    each offer 
the fair product at   , and the 70 percent of consumers with    or    each 
accept a fair product offer. Since there are more firms than consumers (for each preference type), 
supply meets demand for both types of product, i.e. all consumers can buy their preferred 
product but some firms cannot sell their product offer. 
To see that the above actions form an equilibrium, consider possible deviations by the 
market participants.  
  
 
2 Note that    implies that buying a fair product offer is always better than not buying at all. 


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Consider first the consumers. Neither the selfish consumers with    nor the socially 
responsible consumers with    or    have an incentive to deviate to not buying 
because at the given prices they realize payoffs from buying of, respectively, 50 and  . 
Moreover, none of the consumers has an incentive to deviate and buy the respective other 
product type. This follows from equation (1), showing that a consumer’s willingness to pay for 
the fair product on top of the price of the unfair product is given by    . Purely 
self-interested consumers with    thus strictly prefer buying the unfair product at the given 
prices. The 30 percent of consumers with    are however willing to pay a price premium 
of    and thus strictly prefer buying the fair product at the given prices. The 40 percent of 
consumers with    never buy the unfair product as they would even give money to the third 
party in order to equalize payoffs. 
Would any of the firms deviate? Consider first purely self-interested firms. Irrespective of 
whether such a firm can sell its unfair product offer at price   , it does not realize a 
positive profit on top of its endowment. Deviating and offering the fair product at     
would not lead to positive profits, irrespective of whether the offer will be sold or not, because 
the price just covers the cost of production. Offering a product at a price lower or higher than 
   or   , respectively, would lead to zero profits at best. A firm realizes losses 
for lower prices because the price does not cover the cost and it would not be able to sell at 
higher prices due to price competition.  
Consider now socially responsible firms with     or    . Irrespective of 
whether such a firm sells its fair product offer at   , it does not realize a positive profit 
on top of its endowment. Deviating and offering the unfair product at    would lead to a 
loss in case the offer is sold (and to zero profits otherwise). The reason is that equation (2) shows 
that such a firm requires a markup of   on top of the cost of production of the unfair 
product as a compensation for the disutility created by the externality imposed on the third party. 
As with purely self-interested firms, there is no incentive to deviate and offer a product at a price 
lower or higher than    or   , respectively, because this would lead to zero 
profits at best. 
  

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A.5.2.   THE MARKET EQUILIBRIUM WITH     
The predictions of the Fehr-Schmidt model in our high production cost condition with    
and    are given as follows: 
• The market share of the fair product is 40 percent. 
• The fair product trades at    and the unfair product trades at   . 
In particular, the following actions form the market equilibrium: The 60 percent of firms with 
   or    each offer the unfair product at   , and the 60 percent of consumers 
with     or     each accept an unfair product offer. There are more firms than 
consumers so that supply meets demand. While all firms with   can sell their product offer, 
some firms with   cannot. The 40 percent of firms with    each offer the fair 
product at   , and the 40 percent of consumers with    each accept a fair product 
offer. Since there are more firms than consumers, supply meets the demand, but some firms with 
   cannot sell their product offer. 
To see that the above actions form an equilibrium, consider first possible deviations by 
the consumers. No consumer has an incentive to deviate to not buying because they all receive 
strictly positive payoffs from buying—though smaller ones than in case of   . Moreover, 
neither purely self-interested consumers with    nor socially responsible consumers with 
   would deviate to buying the respective other product type as they strictly prefer to buy 
the unfair or fair product, respectively. Consumers with   , however, who are willing to 
pay a price premium of   , are now indifferent between buying the fair product at 
   or the unfair product at   . Hence, they do not have an incentive to deviate 
to buying the fair product.   
Consider now the firms. All purely self-interested firms with    sell their unfair 
product offer at   . In our markets there are more firms than consumers but less than 
twice as many. Given the demand of 60 percent of the consumers, it is thus possible that each of 
the overall 30 percent of purely self-interested firms can sell their offer. These firms do not have 
an incentive to deviate to offering the fair product because they strictly prefer selling the unfair 
product at   , where they make positive profits, over selling the fair product at 
  . Importantly, since all firms with    can sell at   , none of them has an 


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incentive to bid prices down as this would only lower their profits.3 Asking for a lower price for 
the fair product will even lead to losses. Asking for higher prices for either product type leads to 
zero profits as the product offer could not be sold.  
Consider now socially responsible firms with   . Irrespective of whether such a 
firm sells its unfair product offer at   , it does not realize a positive payoff. The reason 
is that equation (2) reveals that the markup of 20 on top of the cost of production of the unfair 
product just compensates them for the loss of imposing the externality on the third party. 
Importantly, this is the reason why firms with    that cannot sell at    would 
not bid down prices and sell the unfair product at a price below 20. At any price    
firms with    would strictly prefer to not sell any product. Equation (2) also reveals that 
firms with    are indifferent between selling the fair product at    or the unfair 
product at   , as they require a price premium of   in order to sell the unfair 
product. Hence, they have no incentive to deviate and offer the fair product. Socially responsible 
firms with    would never offer the unfair product; they just break even at   . 
Note, finally, that offering either product type at higher or lower prices would, at best, lead to 
zero profits for socially responsible firms, i.e., there is no incentive to ask for different prices.  
 
3 If there were more purely self-interested firms than demand for the unfair product at   , such firms 
would bid prices down to cost, i.e. to   . Consumers with    would then strictly prefer buying the 
unfair product and firms with    would strictly prefer offering the fair product at   . The demand for 
the fair product from consumers with    would then be served by firms with    or   . Hence, the 
price of the unfair product would decline, but the market share of the product types would remain unchanged. 

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B. PRICES OVER TIME 
 
FIGURE B.1 
Prices by Product Type in Market Baseline and High Firm Competition Conditions 
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FIGURE B.2 
Prices by Product Type in the Limited Information Conditions 
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FIGURE B.3 
Prices by Product Type in the High Production Cost Condition 
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C. CONSUMERS’ INFORMATION ACQUISITION DECISIONS 
In this appendix we provide more detail on the consumers’ information acquisition decisions. 
The frequencies of information acquisition, 73 and 42 percent when information acquisition is 
free and costly, respectively, are fairly stable across time. If we consider all 8 three-period 
blocks, the frequencies vary between 66 percent and 79 percent in the Free Limited Information 
condition and between 36 and 47 percent in the Costly Limited Information condition. Random-
effects probit regressions of information acquisition reveal no significant time trend in either 
condition. 
Figure C.1 shows the type of product purchased, conditional on consumers’ information 
acquisition decisions. In both Limited Information conditions, consumers who do not acquire 
information typically purchase the product available with the lowest price and thus end up 
purchasing an unfair product, particularly after the first few periods. If we consider only cases in 
which a consumer’s choice set includes both product types, then across both Limited Information 
conditions the lowest-priced product is an unfair product 94 percent of the time; in the second 
half of the experiment (Periods 13-24), this proportion rises to 99 percent. 
Meanwhile, a large majority of consumers who pay for information purchase fair 
products (see the line labeled, “LI Costly – Info”). The fact that only 75 percent of buyers who 
paid for product information purchased fair products is driven both by limited product choices 
and by price sensitivity. For example, among those who acquired product information and saw 
both types of products, a higher proportion (81 percent) purchased fair products. Breaking down 
these cases by the price difference between the cheapest fair and unfair products available, we 
see that the frequency of fair product purchases decreases in the price difference—e.g., 97 
purchase fair products when the price difference is 0 or 1, 72 percent do so when it is between 2 
and 5, 67 percent do so when it is 6 or greater, and the proportion is also 67 percent when it is 10 
or more (in which case the consumer is paying the entire production cost of the fair product). 
Not surprisingly, the proportion of consumers who acquire fair products following the 
acquisition of free information is lower—likely reflecting indifference between having and not 
having the information or curiosity without the intent to act on the obtained information.  
  


12 
 
FIGURE C.1 
Product Purchases Conditional on Consumer Information Acquisition 
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D. CONSUMER AND FIRM HETEROGENEITY 
The analyses in the main paper obscures potentially significant individual differences in concern 
for social impact. Indeed, individual choice experiments—e.g., using dictator games—usually 
reveal heterogeneous concerns for fairness.  
Figure D.1 presents histograms showing, separately, how often each consumer purchased 
or each firm offered a fair product, pooling the individual’s decisions across periods. The top two 
panels, A and B, show the individual behavior of buyers and sellers, respectively, over the entire 
experiment; the bottom two panels, C and D, do so for the second half of the experiment (Periods 
13-24). For consumers, we consider only those periods in which the consumer had a choice 
between at least one fair and one unfair product. 
Looking at the entire experiment, in Panels A and B, we see considerable heterogeneity 
in firm and consumer behavior. For example, while some consumers (6 percent) never purchase 
a fair product, a larger proportion (14 percent) does so in every period. A similar pattern obtains 
for firms: a smaller proportion (12 percent) never offers a fair product than those who always do 
so (19 percent). Moreover, while both graphs have mass at the extremes, the majority of subjects 
lie in between—purchasing or offering both types of products over the course of the experiment. 
In the second half of the experiment, in Panels C and D, there is greater differentiation in 
both firm and consumer behavior. Among consumers, the proportion that never purchase the fair 
product increases to 23 percent, while the proportion who always do so is even higher (29 
percent). For firms, the proportions are similar: 24 and 26 percent, respectively. Thus, for both 
consumers and firms, behavior in the second half of the experiment reflects both high degrees of 
heterogeneity and invariance in individual behavior. Roughly half of firms and consumers either 
always offer or purchase the fair product or never do so. This finding is similar across all market 
conditions—behavior of both firms and consumers is always bimodal. See Figures D.2 to D.5. 
But the proportions of the two extremes changes across conditions in a manner consistent with 
Figure I in the main text. 
  

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FIGURE D.1 
Distributions of Individual Behavior in Market Baseline condition 
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FIGURE D.2 
Distributions of Individual Behavior in the High Firm Competition condition 
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FIGURE D.3 
Distributions of Individual Behavior in the Free Limited Information condition 
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FIGURE D.4 
Distributions of Individual Behavior in the Costly Limited Information condition 
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FIGURE D.5 
Distributions of Individual Behavior in the High Production Cost condition 
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E. ADDITIONAL ANALYSES 
TABLE E.1 
ESTIMATED WEIGHTS FOR CONSUMER UTILITY MODEL (STUDY 2) 
 Market No Market (using matched choice sets only) 
 Switzerland China Switzerland China 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Consumer Earnings () 0.272
*** 
(0.051) 
0.945*** 
(0.125) 
0.246*** 
(0.043) 
0.327*** 
(0.040) 
Third Party Earnings () 0.020
*** 
(0.006) 
0.037*** 
(0.006) 
0.043*** 
(0.006) 
0.051*** 
(0.007) 
Observations 4,827 4,821 4,823 4,823 
Cases 960 960 960 960 
Notes. The table reports coefficient estimates for utility functions as specified in Section V.A., using 
McFadden’s (1974) conditional logit choice model. θ denotes the weight consumers place on their own payoff and 
γ denotes the weight consumers place on the third parties’ payoff. The models include period, gender and ln(age) as 
case-specific (intercept) terms (coefficients omitted). Ln(age) is positively related to making the default / no 
product choice in all models. Robust standard errors (clustered by subject) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. 
 
  

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TABLE E.2 
ESTIMATED WEIGHTS FOR CONSUMER UTILITY MODEL (MARKET VS. NO MARKET) 
 Switzerland (Study 1) 
Switzerland 
(Study 2) 
Switzerland 
(Combined) 
China 
(Study 2) 
Pooled 
(All Data) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Consumer Earnings () 0.337
*** 
(0.040) 
0.248*** 
(0.033) 
0.287*** 
(0.025) 
0.511*** 
(0.065) 
0.319*** 
(0.023) 
Third Party Earnings () 0.029
*** 
(0.006) 
0.018*** 
(0.006) 
0.023*** 
(0.006) 
0.018*** 
(0.006) 
0.025*** 
(0.004) 
No Market X  
Third Party Earnings () 
0.012 
(0.009) 
0.019** 
(0.008) 
0.016*** 
(0.006) 
0.040*** 
(0.008) 
0.016*** 
(0.006) 
China X 
Consumer Earnings ()     
0.049* 
(0.027) 
China X 
Third Party Earnings ()     
-0.011* 
(0.007) 
China X No Market X 
Third Party Earnings ()     
0.022** 
(0.010) 
Observations 8,410 9,654 18,064 9,642 27,706 
Cases 1,680 1,920 3,600 1,920 5,520 
Notes. The table reports coefficient estimates for utility functions as specified in Section V.A., using 
McFadden’s (1974) conditional logit choice model. θ denotes the weight consumers place on their own payoff and γ
denotes the weight consumers place on the third parties’ payoff. No Market is a binary variable taking on value 1 if an
observation comes from the No Market condition and 0 otherwise. China is a binary variable taking on value 1 if an 
observation comes from a session conducted in China and 0 otherwise. The models include period, gender and ln(age)
as case-specific (intercept) terms (coefficients omitted). Ln(age) is positively related to making the default / no product
choice in all models. Robust standard errors (clustered by subject) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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FIGURE E.1 
Fair Purchases / Choices in Market and No Market Conditions  
(excluding choices without a fair alternative) 
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F. EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS 
F.1.   MARKET BASELINE 
 
General instructions 
 
 
We are pleased to welcome you to this economic study. 
 
If you read the following instructions carefully, you can – depending on your decisions and/or 
those of the other participants – earn money in addition to the 15 Swiss francs that you receive 
as an initial endowment for participating. It is thus very important that you read the instructions 
carefully. If you have any questions, please contact us.  
Communication with the other participants is strictly forbidden during the study. Violation 
of this rule will lead to exclusion from the study and loss of all of the associated payments. 
During the study, we will not speak of francs, but of points. Your entire income will thus first be 
calculated in points. The points you earn during the study will be converted to Swiss francs at the 
end of the study. The following conversion rate applies: 
10 points = 2.50 Swiss francs. 
At the end of today’s study, you will receive the number of points earned during the study plus 
the initial endowment of 15 Swiss francs for appearing in cash. 
We will explain the exact procedure of the study on the next pages. For the sake of simplicity, 
we will always use male forms for participants; the instructions also obviously refer to female 
participants. 
  

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The study 
There are three types of participants in this study: participants A, B, and C. The participants in 
this study are divided into groups of 16 people. There are 6 participants A, 5 participants B, and 
5 participants C in each group.  
Participants A are sellers, participants B are buyers. Participants C can neither sell nor 
buy, but they can incur losses due to the transactions between the participants A and B. 
The study last for 24 periods. In each period, each participant A makes exactly one sales offer for 
a product. Participant A thereby determines the type of product and the price for the product. 
• There are two types of products: 
1. “Products with no effect on participant C” and 
2. “Products with a loss for participant C”. 
• Every value from 0 up to and including 50 can be selected as a price. 
The production costs for participants A for a “product with no effect on participant C” amount to 
10 points. Participant A bears no costs (0 points) for the production of a “product with a loss for 
participant C”.  
The value of a product for a participant B is always 50 points, regardless of what type of product 
it is. 
The five participants B see the sales offers made by the six participants A (the price and the type 
of product) and can accept one offer each. The participants B can decide one after the other in a 
random order. Each participant B can only accept one offer. This means that a maximum of five 
of the six participants A can sell a product. 
In each period, each of the five participants B will be randomly assigned to one of the five 
participants C. If a participant B purchases a “product with a loss for participant C”, the assigned 
participant C incurs a loss of 60 points. If a participant B purchases a “product with no effect on 
participant C” or no product at all, the assigned participant C incurs no loss. 
You will see whether you are participant A, B, or C on your screen at the beginning of the 
study. Your role as participant A, B, or C remains the same during the entire study. 
  

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In each period, each participant A, B, and C first receives an endowment of 100 points. The 
payment in points of participant A (seller), participant B (buyer), and participant C in a period 
are thus determined as follows: 
 
Participant A’s payment 
• If a participant B accepts his sales offer 
100 – costs of production + price of the product  
where the production cost amounting to 10 points are incurred only with a “product 
without effect on participant C”. The production costs for a “product with a loss for 
participant C amount to 0. 
• If no participant B accepts his sales offer: 100 
 
Participant B’s payment: 
• If participant B accepts a sales offer 
100 + 50 – price of the product  
• If participant B does not accept a sales offer: 100 
 
 
Participant C’s payment: 
• If the randomly assigned participant B chooses a “Product with loss for participant C” 
100 - 60 = 40 
• If the randomly assigned participant B chooses a “Product without effect on participant 
C” or does not purchase a product: 100 
 

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Procedures on the computer: 
In each period, participants A enter their sales offers on the following screen: 
 
Participant A must indicate whether he wants to offer a “product without effect on participant C” 
or a “product with a loss for participant C.” to do this, the corresponding type of product must be 
clicked on. 
Furthermore, participant A must indicate the price he wants to request for the product. The 
corresponding number must be entered in the box. All integers from 0 up to and including 50 are 
possible. 
Once a participant A has made his decisions, he must click on the OK button at the lower right-
hand side. The type of product and the price can be changed until the OK button is clicked. 
Once all six participants A have made their sales offers, the participants A will see the sales 
offers (the price and the type of product) of all of the other participants A in a table. Here is an 
example: 
 
 
The participant’s own sales offer is always marked in blue. Participants A can always see in the 
column on the right whether and in which order the participants B accept the offers. 
Once all participants B have made their decisions, each participant A will learn of his own 
payment. If his offer is accepted, participant A will also learn participant B’s payment and the 
payment of the corresponding participant C. 
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The participants B can see the sales offers on the screen below in each period:  
 
Participants B see the screen above in a random order and can accept an offer one after the other. 
Thus only one participant B sees the screen above at any one point in time. Only when the 
current participant B has made his decisions will the next participant B see the screen above, 
where he can then accept an offer. 
The participant B who is first shown the screen can select from all offers. The participant B who 
is shown the screen second can only choose from the remaining offers, as each offer can only be 
accepted by one participant B. 
If the five participants B have each accepted an offer, one offer will always remain that can no 
longer be accepted. The participant A who made this offer cannot conclude a sale in this period. 
The order in which the five participants B decide on accepting the six offers will be randomly 
determined anew in each period. 
The prices appear in the left column of the table, and the type of product appears in the right 
column. Each offer is always in a separate row. In order to accept an offer, the corresponding 
row must be clicked on with the mouse. The marked row will then appear with a blue 
background.  
• In order to accept the offer marked in blue, you must click on the ACCEPT button. 
The choice of offer can be changed until the ACCEPT button is clicked on. 
If a participant B does not want to accept an offer, he must click on the DO NOT ACCEPT AN 
OFFER button. Even if a row had already been marked, all offers will be declined if the DO 
NOT ACCEPT AN OFFER is clicked on. 
When all participants B have made their decisions, each participant B will learn of his own 
payment and that of his assigned participant C. 
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Participants C cannot make any decisions during this study. We ask the participants C, 
however, to indicate in each period their expectations about the behaviors of participants A and 
B. 
When all participants A and B have made their decisions, the participants C will learn of their 
own earnings, which are entirely dependent on the decisions of participants A and B. 
After all participants have been informed about their payments in a period, the next period will 
begin.  
Your earnings in this study are the payment out of one randomly selected period. 
Because you do not know which period the computer will randomly select, you must 
consider your decisions in each of the 24 periods very carefully. 
At the end of the study, the corresponding point amount will be converted to Swiss francs 
and paid in cash to you together with the initial endowment. 
Do you have any further questions? If yes, please raise your hand. We will come to you at your 
workplace. Otherwise, we ask you to answer the control questions on the next pages. 
Control questions 
1. Assume that participant A offers a “product without effect on participant C” at the price of 
40 and participant B accepts the offer.  
How high are the payments to participants A and B and the corresponding participant C? 
2. Assume that participant A offers a “product with a loss for participant C” at the price of 40 
and participant B accepts the offer. 
How high are the payments to participants A and B and the corresponding participant C? 
3. Assume that participant A offers a “product without effect on participant C” at the price of 
15 and participant B accepts the offer. 
How high are the payments to participants A and B and the corresponding participant C? 
4. Assume that participant A offers a “product with a loss for participant C” at the price of 15 
and no participant B accepts the offer. 
How high is the payment for participant A? How high is the payment for a participant B 
who does not accept an offer? How high is the payment for the corresponding participant C? 
Please raise your hand when you have completed the control questions. We will then come to 
you at your workplace. 

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F.2.   NO MARKET CONDITION 
 
General instructions 
 
[Exactly as in Market Baseline] 
 
The study 
There are three types of participants in this study: participants A, B, and C. The participants in 
this study are divided into groups of 3 people. There is one participant A, one participant B, and 
one participant C in each group.  
The study last for 24 periods. In each period, one participant A, one participant B, and one 
participant C are randomly assigned to one another. 
In each period, the participants A, B, and C first receive an endowment of 100 points. 
The Participant B in a group can select a different distribution of points. In case of a new 
distribution, the sum of the payments that participants A and B receive is 40 or 50 points greater 
than the initial endowment of 100 points each.  
There are two types of distributions: 
3. “Distribution with no effect on participant C” and 
4. “Distribution with a loss for participant C”. 
If a participant B selects a “distribution with a loss for participant C,” the assigned participant C 
incurs a loss of 60 points. If a participant B selects a “distribution with no effect on participant 
C” or does not opt for a new distribution, the assigned participant C will not incur any loss. 
You will see whether you are participant A, B, or C on your screen at the beginning of the 
study. Your role as participant A, B, or C remains the same during the entire study. 

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In each period, each participant A, B, and C first receives an endowment of 100 points. The 
payment in points of participant A, B, and C in a period depend on the participant B’s decisions 
and are determined as follows: 
 
Participant A’s payment 
• If the randomly assigned participant B selects a new distribution 
Payment in the new distribution 
• If the participant B does not select a new distribution: 100 
 
 
Participant B’s payment: 
• If he selects a new distribution 
Payment in the new distribution  
• If he does not select a new distribution: 100 
 
 
Participant C’s payment: 
• If the randomly assigned participant B chooses a “Distribution with loss for participant 
C” 
100 - 60 = 40 
• If the randomly assigned participant B chooses a “Distribution without effect on 
participant C” or does not select a new distribution: 100 
 
In case of a “distribution without effect on Participant C,” the sum of the payments for 
participant A and participant B is 40 points higher than if no new distribution is chosen, for 
example 125 points for participant A and 115 points for participant B (and 100 points for 
participant C). 
In case of a “distribution with a loss for Participant C,” the sum of the payments for participant A 
and participant B is 50 points higher than if no new distribution is chosen, for example 120 
points for participant A and 130 points for participant B (and 100 – 60 = 40 points for participant 
C). 

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Procedures on the computer: 
In each period, participants B can select from possible new distributions on the following 
screen: 
  
Participants B can choose from two to six different distributions in each period. In this case, for 
example, participant B can choose between five new, different distributions. 
The left column of the table shows the possible payments for participant A, the middle column 
shows the possible payments for participant B, and the type of distribution is shown in the right 
column. Each new distribution always appears in a separate row. In order to select a new 
distribution, the box at the far right must be clicked on with the mouse.  
• The SELECT button must be clicked on in order to select the chosen distribution. 
The type of distribution can be changed until the SELECT button is clicked. 
If a participant B does not want to select a new distribution, he must press the DO NOT SELECT 
A DIFFERENT DISTRIBUTION button. Even if new distribution had already been marked, no 
new distribution will be selected if the DO NOT SELECT A DIFFERENT DISTRIBUTION 
button is chosen. 
When all participants B have made their decisions, the assigned participants A and C will be 
informed of the decision. 

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Participants A and C cannot make any decisions during this study. We ask the participants A 
and C, however, to indicate their expectations about the participant B’s behavior in each period. 
After all participants have been informed about their payments in a period, the next period will 
begin.  
Your earnings in this study are the payment out of one randomly selected period. 
Because you do not know which period the computer will randomly select, you must 
consider your decisions – if you are a participant B – in each of the 24 periods very 
carefully. 
At the end of the study, the corresponding point amount will be converted to Swiss francs 
and paid in cash to you together with the initial endowment. 
Do you have any further questions? If yes, please raise your hand. We will come to you at your 
workplace. Otherwise, we ask you to answer the control questions on the next pages. 
 
Control questions 
1. Assume that participant B chooses a new distribution and this is a “distribution without 
effect on participant C.”  
How high are the payments to the participants A, B, and C randomly assigned to each other 
in this period? 
2. Assume that participant B chooses a new distribution and this is a “distribution with a loss 
for participant C.” 
How high are the payments to the participants A, B, and C randomly assigned to each other 
in this period? 
3. Assume that participant B chooses no new distribution. 
How high are the payments to the participants A, B, and C randomly assigned to each other 
in this period? 
Please raise your hand when you have completed the control questions. We will then come to 
you at your workplace. 
 
